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Chapter One
Introduction
From the beginning of research on payout policy, academicians strive to un-
derstand why dividends persist, whether dividend policy aects rm value,
and what are the determinants of dividend payouts. Miller and Modigliani
substantiated their claim of a dividend policy irrelevance to the rm valua-
tion by equating the paid out dividends value to the appreciated stock price
in case of retaining the dividends (Miller and Modigliani, 1961). Their cor-
nerstone work convincingly demonstrated that an investment decision of a
rm but not its dividend policy determine rm value.
In an eort to justify the existence of dividends, the subsequent research de-
veloped by loosening the perfect market restrictions underlying the Miller
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and Modigliani theory. In particular, lifting the assumption of perfectly sym-
metric information has given a rise to a number of payout theories. The most
prominent among them are the dividend signaling and the free cash ow
hypotheses. Both theories rest on the assumption of a separation of corpo-
rate ownership and control and, as a result, a conict between sharehold-
ers and managers, which has been acknowledged as early as in the Adam
Smith’s "The Wealth of Nations" (1887). Signaling theories explain the exis-
tence of dividends with a mitigation of informational asymmetries between
owners and managers due to unexpected changes in dividend payouts. The
rst mention of the informational content of dividends is being found in
Modigliani and Miller (1959). Subsequent studies elaborated on this idea and
developed formal signaling models. Dividends in these models are viewed
as a costly signal which is used to credibly convey managers’ expectations
of future cash ows (Bhattacharya, 1979; John and Williams, 1985; Miller
and Rock, 1985). The free cash ow problem laid out by Jensen (1986) refers
to an imprudent behavior of managers investing free cash ows in negative
net present value projects. Among other disciplining mechanisms, dividends
may decrease the free cash ow available for nancing managerial decisions
that deteriorate rm value.
A conceptually dierent explanation of dividends has been made possible
due to the Kahneman and Tversky’s investigation of a human economic be-
havior which laid a foundation of a new research paradigm. Their prospect
theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), as well as the theory of self-control
(Thaler and Shefrin, 1981), have been applied by Shefrin and Statman (1984)
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to explain the existence of dividends. In contrast to the standard nancial
theory, the authors demonstrate that dividend and capital gains are not per-
fect substitutes. The other unconventional studies look into the determi-
nants of the level of dividend payouts. They examine the impact of local
demographic and cultural characteristics on corporate dividend policy (Gra-
ham and Kumar, 2006; Becker et al., 2011; Ucar, 2015). This literature, how-
ever, is scarce, and a continued search of socio-demographic explanations
can deepen our knowledge on the factors of dividend payouts.
The objective of this thesis is threefold. First, we1 strive to understand
whether managers pay attention to the specic thresholds when setting div-
idend payouts. We show empirically that managers indeed try to set div-
idends per share such that they exceed those from the previous quarter.
However, they do not systematically beat analysts’ forecasts. Second, I ask
the question whether this observed managers’ behavior is fully rational.
Specically, I look into the wealth eects of meeting or missing the divi-
dend threshold targets. In doing so I pay special attention to confounding
events and learn about the marginal information content of earnings and
dividend surprises. My results demonstrate that only earnings news and not
dividend news make market participants reconsider their stock price valua-
tions. Thus, this study is in line with the Miller and Modigliani’s vision on
the rm value determinants. Lastly, I uncover a novel link between a rm’s
geographic dispersion and its payout policy. I argue that a rm’s geographic
1Chapter 2 of this dissertation is based on a joint work, whereas Chapters 3 and 4 are based
on single-authored working papers. Co-authorship is indicated by the use of corresponding
personal pronouns throughout the introduction and the remaining chapters of this dissertation.
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dispersion is related to investor awareness of a rm; and that the latter in
turn is related to a rm’s payout policy. My empirical results are consis-
tent with these arguments. The ndings of my dissertation should be of
particular interest to professional money managers, as well as for corporate
nancial ocers and corporate boards setting the rm’s dividend policy.
This dissertation is comprised of three self-contained chapters. Each chapter
represents a working paper with an identical title. In the following I sum-
marize research questions, peculiarities in the data and research methods,
and key results of each chapter.
Chapter 2.2
It is well known that managers manage earnings in order to report prots
that exceed those reported in the previous quarter and prots that exceed an-
alyst forecasts. This pattern is consistent with the notion that managers care
about investor expectations in general and analyst forecasts in particular
when making earnings announcements. In this paper we analyze whether a
similar pattern can be detected for dividend announcements.
Our hypotheses are based on the assumption that managers care about the
market’s reaction to dividend announcements. There is ample empirical ev-
idence that they do. Asquith and Mullins (1986) conclude from the results of
an empirical analysis that "dividends are habitforming. If the market does
not receive its expected dosage, the stock price will suer withdrawal symp-
toms" (p. 35).
2This chapter is based on a joint work with Erik Theissen.
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Our results provide clear evidence that managers avoid dividend cuts. Small
decreases are signicantly less likely than small increases. We do not nd a
similar pattern for dividends relative to analyst forecasts. In fact, dividends
that fall short by one cent of the consensus forecast are more frequent than
dividends that slightly exceed the forecast. Our results thus support the no-
tion that the relevant threshold for dividends is the previous dividend, not
the analyst forecast.
Chapter 3.3
Results obtained in the previous chapter indicate that managers of the pub-
lic companies in the U.S. do not set their payout policy such as to beat stock
analysts’ dividend expectations. This evidence seems to be at odds with the
underlying theory of the dividend information content. According to the in-
formation content hypothesis, new dividend information should be reected
in stock prices. Negative surprises to the market should therefore be ac-
companied with negative stock price changes. In theory, a negative market
reaction should discipline managers to avoid falling short of the market ex-
pectations.
Despite a long tradition of estimating the wealth eects of dividends, test
results are still inconclusive. Most of the earlier eorts in empirical research
were in favor of a dividend policy eect on stock prices (see Fama et al.
(1969); Pettit (1972, 1976); Charest (1978); Aharony and Swary (1980); Wool-
ridge (1983), and Andres et al. (2013) among others). Watts (1973) refutes
this premise. Gonedes (1978) and more recently Amihud and Li (2006) also
3This chapter is based on a single-authored working paper.
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fail to support the hypothesis. In light of these conicting ndings, I revisit
the topic of the information content of dividends.
The major problem in empirical tests of the dividends information content
hypothesis is an inability to observe unexpected changes in dividends. Thus,
distinct dividend expectation models may be accountable for the mixed re-
sults on the validity of the information hypothesis. The existing literature
predominantly estimates stock market eects using dividend decreases and
increases as a measure of the unexpected dividend change. This approach
implicitly assumes constant dividends as a model of market expectations. A
serious drawback of this naïve model is that an absolute dividend change
contains some anticipated component. The model does not allow for up-
dates in market beliefs in a period between subsequent dividend announce-
ments, which clearly contradicts observable adjustments in analysts’ esti-
mates and recommendations. I contribute to the discussion using an un-
derexploited identication strategy approximating market expectations with
analysts’ dividend expectations available from I/B/E/S. In this chapter, I crit-
ically discuss a usage of analysts’ expectations as a model of market expec-
tations.
Another empirical issue with a test of the dividend information hypothe-
sis is that dividend announcements are often accompanied by earnings an-
nouncements. Therefore, an identication strategy that omits this factor
risks falsely attributing an earnings information eect to that of the divi-
dend. I provide a number of tests that aim to isolate potential contempora-
neous earnings eects on stock prices.
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This study nds that, in a panel of U.S. companies in the period from 2002 to
2012, stock market participants do not price dividend information. I demon-
strate that the market neither appreciates nor depreciates the stock value of
rms that exceed analysts’ dividend expectations or fail to do so. I show that
earnings, on the contrary, have a signicant rm valuation eect.
Chapter 4.4
In the next study I investigate the eect of investor awareness on corporate
payout policy. The existing literature suggests that rms may use dividends
and repurchases to increase retail investor attention to the rm (Brav et al.,
2005; Drake et al., 2012). One way for an investor to become aware of a
rm is by being in the geographic area of the rm. Theoretically, investors
may encounter the rm’s branch during their daily routines, whether using
services or products of the rm, being employed by the company, from local
news, or by word of mouth.
There are a number of reasons to hypothesize that investor awareness of
the rm increases with the rm’s geographic dispersion. Local bias is a
well-established phenomenon which describes a tendency of both institu-
tional and retail investors to allocate their capital into stocks of well-known
and geographically proximate companies (see Coval and Moskowitz (1999,
2001); Baik et al. (2010) for evidence on institutional investors’ local bias; see
Grinblatt and Keloharju (2002); Huberman (2001); Bodnaruk (2009); Ivkovic
and Weisbenner (2005); Seasholes and Zhu (2010) for evidence on individ-
ual investors’ local bias). One possible explanation for local bias is famil-
4This chapter is based on a single-authored working paper.
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iarity. This phenomenon is described in Huberman (2001) and Keloharju
et al. (2012). Huberman (2001) documents a tendency of investors to hold
stock of providers of local telephone services. Keloharju et al. (2012) inves-
tigate investment behavior of car buyers from Finland. They conclude that
a patronage behavior of investors makes them buy stocks of rms whose
products they have experienced.
Evidence from the local bias and familiarity literature thus suggests that,
compared to widely dispersed rms, rms with low geographic dispersion
exhibit lower investor awareness. In order to gain investor attention, these
rms may adopt higher payout strategies. I contribute to the literature by
addressing the following research questions: First, do rms with high (low)
geographic dispersion have lower (higher) payouts? Second, can the reached
level of investor awareness explain the established relationship, if any?
To answer the rst question, I obtain 10-K lings submitted by rms annu-
ally to the United States Securities and Exchange Commission. These l-
ings provide necessary data on the rm geographic locations. Using U.S.
states as the location denition, I observe a highly statistically signicant
and economically relevant relation between a rm’s geographic dispersion
and dividends, controlling for rm size, investment opportunities, CEO op-
tions, leverage, free cash ows, and several geography related proxies for
severeness of agency problems. This relation also holds for repurchases. An
increase in the rm economic presence by three states is associated with a
7% decrease in the dividend yield or an 8% decrease in the repurchase yield.
In the subsequent analyses, I explain the channel of the uncovered geogra-
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phy eect. I conduct a number of tests to conrm that using information
on a rm’s geographic location is a reasonable method to proxy for investor
awareness. I hypothesize that if geographic dispersion is a good proxy of
awareness then it should be manifested in the Internet searches of a rm.
I extract data on Google Search Volume Index (SVI) of a rm name across
U.S. states. An analysis of these data reveals that in 95% of rm-year ob-
servations, companies have a higher Google search volume from the states
where they are economically present than from other states. This and other
pieces of evidence suggest that key explanatory variables, which I construct
using geographic rm characteristics, are informative about the degree of
investors’ rm awareness.
Also, I use this evidence combined with the fact that retail rms are more
visible to investors than non-retail rms, everything else being equal. My
main hypothesis suggests that visibility of a rm negatively relates to its
payout levels. The results from the sample split analysis are consistent with
the awareness explanation of dividends; the eect of investor awareness on
dividends is more pronounced in the retail rms subsample than in the non-
retail rms subsample.
In the remaining robustness checks I use other geography-based measures of
investor awareness. I also employ several proxies to control for the agency
costs and the dividend clientèle explanations of dividends. Furthermore, I
discover that small rms are more prone to the awareness eect on payout
policy, compared to the large rms. This evidence is in line with an expec-
tation that smaller rms should prot more from an increase in the state
10 Introduction
economic presence than rms that are already large and enjoy a relatively
high investor recognition.
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Chapter Two
To Meet or Beat Analysts’
Dividend Forecasts
2.1 Introduction
It is well known that managers care about investor expectations in gen-
eral and analyst forecasts in particular when making earnings announce-
ments. Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and Degeorge et al. (1999) nd that
there are signicantly more reports of small positive than of small nega-
tive earnings, signicantly more reports of small earnings increases than of
small decreases, and signicantly more reports of earnings that slightly ex-
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ceed the consensus analyst forecast than of earnings that slightly fall short
of the consensus forecast.1 This pattern is consistent with the notion that
managers manage earnings in order to report (1) positive prots, (2) prof-
its that exceed those reported in the previous quarter, and (3) prots that
exceed analyst forecasts. Almeida et al. (2016) nd that rms that are just
about to miss the analysts’ earnings per share forecast are signicantly more
likely to initiate repurchases that increases earnings per share. Bartov et al.
(2002) provide evidence that rms that meet or beat analysts’ expectations
are rewarded by higher subsequent stock returns, even in cases where the
"meeting or beating" has been achieved by earnings management.
In this paper we analyze whether a similar pattern can be detected for div-
idend announcements. Using a broad sample of dividend announcements
made by listed U.S. corporations in the period 2003—2014 we test (1) whether
there are more small dividend increases than small decreases, and (2) whether
there are more dividend announcements that slightly exceed analysts’ div-
idend forecasts than announcements that slightly fall short of analyst fore-
casts.
Several papers have demonstrated that there are indeed more dividend in-
1Brown and Pinello (2007) nd that upward earnings management is less pronounced for
annual than for quarterly earnings. They attribute their nding to the fact that annual reports
are subject to independent audits. They also nd, however, that managers use downward ex-
pectations management as a substitute for earnings management. Daniel et al. (2008) argue
that target dividend levels may also serve as an earnings threshold. Covenants in debt contract
may put a limit on the percentage of current earnings that can be paid out as dividends. Con-
sequently, managers may have an incentive to report higher earnings in order to be able to pay
out a target dividend. In their empirical analysis the authors nd evidence consistent with this
hypothesis. There are other patterns in reported earnings besides those alluded to here. For
example, Carslaw (1988) and Thomas (1989) nd that managers tend to round earnings gures.
Baker et al. (2016) nd that this result extends to dividends. Both dividend levels and dividend
changes tend to cluster on round numbers.
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creases than decreases (e.g. Charest (1978), Handjinicolaou and Kalay (1984),
Eades et al. (1985), Lang and Litzenberger (1989), Bajaj and Vijh (1990), Dhillon
and Johnson (1994), Yoon and Starks (1995), Grullon et al. (2002), Allen and
Michaely (2003)). Baker et al. (2016) show explicitly that there are more small
dividend increases than decreases. The main contribution of our paper is the
test of the second hypothesis. To the best of our knowledge this is the rst
paper that tests whether managers set dividends to meet or beat analysts’
forecasts.2
Our hypotheses are based on the assumption that managers care about the
market’s reaction to dividend announcements. There is ample empirical ev-
idence that they do. Based on the surveys he conducted, Lintner (1956) con-
cluded that managers believe that "the market puts a premium on stability
or gradual growth in rate" (p. 99) and that therefore "most managements
sought to avoid making changes in their dividend rates that might have to
be reversed within a year or so" (p. 99). More recently Brav et al. (2005)
surveyed 384 nancial executives and report that the overwhelming major-
ity (88.1%) of the respondents believe that there are negative consequences
to cutting dividends. 93.8% (out of 166 respondents from dividend-paying
rms) report that they try to avoid reducing dividends per share, and 89.6%
state that they try to maintain a smooth dividend stream. 77.9% indicate that
2The paper that comes closest in this respect is Woolridge (1983). He relates dividend an-
nouncements to the forecasts made by Value Line, an investment advisory rm, and nds that
positive forecast errors far outnumber negative forecast errors. However, Woolridge’s sample
is very small (225 rms), and he reports (p. 1610) that Value Line tended to underestimate div-
idends. Specically, Value Line predicted an unchanged dividend in the majority of the cases
under investigation even though the sample period was one of generally increasing dividends.
Most importantly, Woolridge (1983) does not analyze whether managers deliberately set divi-
dends such as to meet or beat analysts’ forecasts.
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they are reluctant to "make dividend changes that might have to be reversed
in the future" (p. 494). Asquith and Mullins (1986) conclude from the results
of an empirical analysis that "dividends are habit-forming. If the market
does not receive its expected dosage, the stock price will suer withdrawal
symptoms" (p. 35).
These ndings suggest that managers care about dividend announcements
because they anticipate that the announcement will aect the share price.
Consistent with this view, numerous studies have conrmed that share prices
increase upon the announcement of a dividend increase and decrease upon
the announcement of a dividend cut (e.g. Fama et al. (1969), Pettit (1972),
Charest (1978), Woolridge (1983), Handjinicolaou and Kalay (1984), Eades
et al. (1985), Asquith and Mullins (1986), Lang and Litzenberger (1989), Ba-
jaj and Vijh (1990), Dhillon and Johnson (1994), Yoon and Starks (1995), Lie
(2000), Grullon et al. (2002), Dhillon et al. (2003)).3 Several theories pro-
vide reasons why dividend changes may trigger share price reactions. The
most prominent among them are models of dividend signaling (Bhattacharya
(1979), John and Williams (1985), Miller and Rock (1985), Baker et al. (2016))
and the free cash ow hypothesis (Easterbrook (1984), Jensen (1986)).
Earnings and dividend announcements are often made jointly. In these cases
it is necessary to dierentiate between the information content of the earn-
ings and the dividend announcement. Several papers have attempted to
disentangle the two eects (e.g. by only considering cases in which the
3In contrast to the bulk of the literature some papers have concluded that the information
content of dividends is trivial (e.g. Watts (1973), Gonedes (1978)). Amihud and Li (2006) provide
evidence that the information content of dividends has declined over time.
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announcements were made on dierent dates). The results are somewhat
ambiguous. Some authors have concluded that dividends do not contain in-
formation beyond that reected in earnings gures (e.g. Gonedes (1978)).
On the other side Aharony and Swary (1980) nd that "changes in quarterly
cash dividends provide useful information beyond that provided by corre-
sponding quarterly earnings numbers" (p. 11), a result which is conrmed
by Leftwich and Zmijewski (1994). Andres et al. (2013) nd similar results
in the German equity market.
Our results provide clear evidence that managers avoid dividend cuts. Small
decreases are signicantly less likely than small increases. We do not nd a
similar patterns for dividends relative to analyst forecasts. In fact, dividends
that fall short by one cent of the consensus forecast are more frequent than
dividends that slightly exceed the forecast. Our results thus support the no-
tion that the relevant threshold for dividends is the previous dividend, not
the analyst forecast.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.2 we de-
scribe our sample and present descriptive statistics. The empirical results
are contained in Section 2.3, Section 2.4 describes the robustness checks we
have implemented and Section 2.5 concludes.
To Meet or Beat Analysts’ Dividend Forecasts 21
2.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics
Our analysis requires data on actual dividend announcements, analysts’ div-
idend forecasts, and rm fundamentals. Our sample period starts in 20034
and ends in 2014. It comprises all U.S. stocks for which data on analysts’ div-
idend forecasts is available in I/B/E/S. Data on fundamentals is taken from
Compustat. We obtain the dividend data from I/B/E/S. I/B/E/S contains data
on mean and median analyst dividend forecasts which is updated monthly.
We only consider forecasts of the next quarterly dividend and only retain the
last forecast published prior to the actual dividend announcement. We delete
cases in which the actual dividends and the forecasts are reported in dier-
ent currencies, and cases in which the forecast interval reported in I/B/E/S
extends until after the actual dividend announcement. The intersection of
the analyst data and the actual dividend announcement data yields 65,207
rm-quarter observations.5 Dividend initiations and omissions are included
in the sample. We refer to this sample as the full sample.
Many rms either pay no dividend at all, or have a track record of keeping
the dividend constant throughout the quarters of a scal year. In both cases
dividends are easy to forecast. To check the robustness of our results we
therefore repeat the entire analysis using a restricted sample that only con-
4Data on analysts’ dividend forecasts is available from 2002 onwards. However, the number
of forecasts in 2002 is very low. We therefore decided to start the sample in 2003.
5To identify special dividends, we follow De Angelo et al. (2000). From the CRSP database
we obtain all dividend distributions for the rms in our sample using ncusip as an identier.
Then we count how often special dividends (distribution codes 1262 and 1272 as in De Angelo
et al. (2000)) were declared by the sample rms. We identify 600 cases. We match the dividend
declaration dates with those from our I/B/E/S sample. 570 of the declaration dates do not appear
in the I/B/E/S sample. This leaves us with 30 special dividend announcements that are included
in our full sample. For the restricted sample, to be described below, this number reduces to 8.
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tains dividend changes (i.e. observations in which the dividend in quarter t
is dierent from the dividend in quarter t-1). Further, some rms pay a divi-
dend only once a year or pay the same dividend in all but one quarters of the
year (e.g. sequences such as 0,0,5,0 or 3,3,5,3). In these cases (a total of 591
rm-years) we delete the quarter after the diering dividend payment from
the sample because the dividend change in that quarter is easy to predict.
The restricted sample contains 22,838 observations.
The variables of interest for our analysis are (1) dividend changes and per-
centage dividend changes and (2) dividend forecast errors and percentage
dividend forecast errors. A dividend change is simply the dierence, mea-
sured in USD, between the actual and the previous dividend. The percent-
age dividend change is the dividend change expressed as a percentage of
the most recent quarterly dividend. The dividend forecast error is the dif-
ference between the actual dividend and a summary statistic of the analyst
forecasts. In the main analysis we use the median analyst forecast. As a
robustness check we also use the mean forecast. The percentage dividend
forecast error is the forecast error expressed as a percentage of the mean or
median forecast. In cases in which the mean or median forecast is zero, the
percentage forecast error is not dened and we set the value to "missing".
We winsorize all variables at the 1% and 99% percentile.
Table 2.2.1—Table 2.2.3 provide descriptive statistics for the two samples de-
scribed above. Table 2.2.1 provides information on the distribution of divi-
dend changes across years in the full sample (see Table 2.2.1, Panel A) and in
the restricted sample (see Table 2.2.1, Panel B). The annual number of obser-
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vations in the full sample ranges between 1,817 (in 2003) and 6,879 (in 2013).
In almost 75% of the cases the dividend is unchanged. Increases (18.9% of the
observations) are much more frequent than decreases (6.4%). This relation
holds in every year with the exception of the crisis year 2009. Conditional
on a change in the dividend, the percentage increase is smaller, at 18.8%,6
than the average percentage decrease (-39.1% including dividend omissions).
This pattern holds for all years. The annual number of observations in the
restricted sample ranges between 468 in 2003 and 1,632 in 2013. As in the
full sample dividend increases occur much more frequently than decreases.
Table 2.2.2 reports the number of analysts that have reported dividend fore-
casts to the I/B/E/S database. This number increases throughout the sample
period. The table also reveals, however, that there is a large number of rms
for which only one forecast is available. The values for the rst quartile in-
dicate that in every single year of the sample period for more than 25% of
the rms only one analyst dividend forecast is available. To check the ro-
bustness of our results we repeat all analyses after excluding observations
with only one analyst forecast (see Section 2.4).
Table 2.2.3 reports summary statistics on analysts’ forecast errors. As noted
above, the forecast error is dened as the actual dividend minus the median
forecast. The fact that the median forecast error is always zero (and, in the
full sample, even the third quartile forecast error is zero) indicates that ana-
lysts are often able to forecast the correct dividend exactly. The mean fore-
6Note that dividend initiations are not included in the calculation of the percentage dividend
increase because the percentage increase is not dened for initiations.
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Table 2.2.1: Distribution of Dividend Changes
This table shows the distribution of dividend decreases and increases. Dividend initiations are
not included. The percentage dividend change is dened as the signed dierence between the
current and the previous quarterly dividend, expressed as a percentage of the previous
quarterly dividend.
Year Obs. decreases Avg. percentage decrease, % Obs. no change Obs. increases Avg. percentage increase, %
Panel A. Full sample
2003 97 -38.31 1,339 381 18.2
2004 173 -29.75 2,259 773 22.3
2005 164 -27.90 1,863 687 19.0
2006 140 -31.01 2,131 716 17.7
2007 224 -34.92 3,081 991 17.2
2008 322 -41.99 2,898 844 16.2
2009 567 -53.38 3,093 519 13.7
2010 357 -41.23 4,433 686 17.4
2011 350 -40.13 5,045 1,016 20.7
2012 339 -40.39 5,327 1,116 20.2
2013 424 -48.47 5,180 1,275 23.8
2014 282 -41.24 5,131 1,217 19.4
Total 3,439 -39.1 40,441 10,221 18.8
Panel B. Restricted sample
2003 87 -38.67 0 381 18.2
2004 130 -29.10 0 773 22.3
2005 139 -29.04 0 687 19.0
2006 116 -32.96 0 716 17.7
2007 188 -34.86 0 991 17.2
2008 272 -43.59 0 844 16.2
2009 523 -56.20 0 519 13.7
2010 266 -39.69 0 685 17.4
2011 262 -40.87 0 1,016 20.7
2012 268 -39.89 0 1,116 20.2
2013 357 -51.19 0 1,275 23.8
2014 242 -42.98 0 1,217 19.4
Total 2,850 -39.9 0 10,220 18.8
cast error is predominantly positive. Exceptions only occur in 2008 and 2009.
Thus, the average dividend is slightly higher than the average forecast. This
is consistent with our hypothesis that managers try to avoid falling short of
analyst expectations, either by raising the dividend above the forecast or by
successfully "managing downwards" the expectations of analysts.
Table 2.2.4 addresses the question whether analysts, on average, beat a naïve
forecast which simply uses the previous dividend to forecast the next div-
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Table 2.2.2: Temporal Distribution of the Number of Analysts
This table shows the number of analysts providing dividend forecasts.
Year Obs. Mean Std. Min Max p25 p50 p75
Panel A. Full sample
2003 2,602 1.80 1.35 1 11 1 1 2
2004 3,834 2.17 1.71 1 13 1 2 3
2005 3,346 2.23 1.78 1 14 1 2 3
2006 3,826 2.25 1.70 1 12 1 2 3
2007 5,079 2.23 1.60 1 13 1 2 3
2008 4,671 2.47 1.77 1 12 1 2 3
2009 5,181 2.49 1.94 1 17 1 2 3
2010 6,505 2.66 2.40 1 23 1 2 3
2011 7,196 2.97 2.87 1 25 1 2 4
2012 7,589 3.15 2.98 1 23 1 2 4
2013 7,694 3.25 2.98 1 23 1 2 4
2014 7,684 3.35 2.94 1 22 1 2 4
Total 65,207 2.73 2.46 1 25 1 2 3
Panel B. Restricted sample
2003 1,253 1.66 1.23 1 11 1 1 2
2004 1,530 1.95 1.56 1 11 1 1 2
2005 1,454 2.02 1.56 1 12 1 1 2
2006 1,669 2.12 1.59 1 12 1 2 3
2007 1,956 2.14 1.58 1 13 1 2 3
2008 1,707 2.33 1.72 1 11 1 2 3
2009 2,031 2.34 1.93 1 14 1 2 3
2010 1,961 2.41 2.06 1 16 1 2 3
2011 2,032 3.00 2.80 1 24 1 2 4
2012 2,165 3.25 2.93 1 23 1 2 4
2013 2,412 3.46 3.07 1 23 1 3 5
2014 2,489 3.45 2.95 1 22 1 2 5
Total 22,659 2.61 2.36 1 24 1 2 3
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Table 2.2.3: Percentile Distribution of Dividend Forecast Errors
This table shows the distribution of dividend forecast errors. Dividend forecast errors are de-
ned as the actual minus the median forecasted dividend. Variables are winsorized at the 1st
and 99th percentile.
Year Obs. Mean Std. p05 p25 p50 p75 p95
Panel A. Full sample
2003 2,602 0.0012 0.0428 -0.03 -0.0025 0 0 0.03
2004 3,834 0.0017 0.0339 -0.02 0 0 0 0.03
2005 3,346 0.0014 0.0358 -0.02 0 0 0 0.03
2006 3,826 0.0012 0.0356 -0.02 0 0 0 0.03
2007 5,079 0.0000 0.0335 -0.02 0 0 0 0.02
2008 4,671 -0.0008 0.0326 -0.02 0 0 0 0.02
2009 5,181 -0.0003 0.0314 -0.02 0 0 0 0.01
2010 6,505 0.0008 0.0263 -0.01 0 0 0 0.01
2011 7,196 0.0018 0.0266 -0.01 0 0 0 0.02
2012 7,589 0.0022 0.0276 -0.01 0 0 0 0.02
2013 7,694 0.0027 0.0346 -0.01 0 0 0 0.03
2014 7,684 0.0025 0.0310 -0.01 0 0 0 0.03
Total 65,207 0.0012 0.0326 -0.02 0 0 0 0.02
Panel B. Restricted sample
2003 1,253 0.0033 0.0495 -0.05 -0.002 0 0.004 0.07
2004 1,532 0.0067 0.0447 -0.03 0 0 0.01 0.07
2005 1,458 0.0049 0.0457 -0.03 0 0 0.01 0.06
2006 1,671 0.0056 0.0458 -0.03 0 0 0.01 0.06
2007 1,962 0.0042 0.0436 -0.03 0 0 0.01 0.06
2008 1,723 -0.0010 0.0472 -0.08 -0.002 0 0 0.04
2009 2,044 -0.0015 0.0442 -0.07 0 0 0 0.04
2010 1,981 0.0037 0.0410 -0.02 0 0 0 0.05
2011 2,063 0.0079 0.0449 -0.02 0 0 0 0.07
2012 2,191 0.0079 0.0443 -0.02 0 0 0.01 0.08
2013 2,447 0.0091 0.0553 -0.05 0 0 0.01 0.13
2014 2,513 0.0080 0.0481 -0.02 0 0 0.01 0.09
Total 22,838 0.0049 0.0462 -0.04 0 0 0.01 0.07
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idend. The gures reveal that the analyst forecasts are signicantly more
accurate than the naïve forecast. This result is consistent with the evidence
provided in Bilinski and Bradshaw (2015). These authors analyze analyst
dividend forecasts for rms in 16 countries and conclude that the analyst
forecasts are more accurate than other estimates such as forecasts based on
time-series models.
Table 2.2.4: Comparison of Mean Analyst and Naïve Forecast Errors
This table provides the mean analyst and naïve dividend forecast errors and t-test results. Panel
A compares absolute forecast errors, Panel B percentage forecast errors. The analyst dividend
forecast error is dened as the actual minus the median forecasted dividend. The percentage
analyst dividend forecast error is the forecast error expressed as a percentage of the median
forecast. The naïve forecast error is the current quarter dividend minus the previous quarter
dividend. The percentage naïve forecast error is dened as the naïve forecast error expressed
as a percentage of the previous quarter dividend. The number of observations is lower in Panel
B (percentage forecast errors) than in Panel A (absolute forecast errors) because the percentage
forecast error (percentage naïve forecast error) is not dened when the median forecast (pre-
vious quarter dividend) is zero. The last column reports t-tests for dierences in means. ***
indicates signicance at the 1% level. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile.
Obs. Analyst forecast errors Naïve forecast errors t-stat
Panel A. Forecast errors, USD
Full sample 56,792 0.0015 0.0028 (6.13)***
Restricted sample 13,776 0.0089 0.0277 (10.91)***
Panel B. Forecast errors, %
Full sample 44,228 0.9344 2.3274 (15.50)***
Restricted sample 12,748 3.7071 20.7988 (21.25)***
2.3 Results
We hypothesize that (1) managers avoid dividend decreases and that they
(2) avoid falling short of the consensus analyst forecast. Hypothesis 1 im-
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plies that there should be less small dividend decreases than there are small
dividend increases. Similarly, hypothesis 2 implies that there are less small
negative forecast errors (i.e. cases in which the actual dividend is slightly
lower than the consensus forecast) than small positive forecast errors.
We present the results using histograms of dividend changes (hypothesis 1)
and forecast errors (hypothesis 2). In these histograms we exclude obser-
vations with zero dividend changes and zero forecast errors, respectively.
Because we are interested in small dividend changes and forecast errors we
only show absolute dividend changes and forecast errors ranging from -10
cents to + 10 cents and relative dividend changes and forecast errors ranging
from -10% to +10%, respectively. In each gure Panel A contains a histogram
for the full sample, while Panel B contains the corresponding histogram for
the restricted sample.
In their paper on earnings management Degeorge et al. (1999) propose a test
of the null hypothesis that the distributions of earnings changes and earn-
ings surprises are continuous at the threshold level of zero. In principle this
test can be applied to dividend changes and forecast errors. However, while
earnings per share can reasonably be assumed to be continuous, dividends
per share are not distributed continuously because they are deliberately set,
and usually are set to full cents. We therefore apply the Degeorge et al.
(1999) test only to percentage dividend changes and percentage forecast er-
rors.7 The test results are displayed in the histograms (see Figure 2.3.2 and
7For details see the appendix in Degeorge et al. (1999). To perform the test we group the data
into 20 1% bins. Note that we exclude zero percentage dividend changes and forecast errors from
the sample because we want to test whether there are more small positive values than small
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Figure 2.3.4, respectively).
Table 2.3.1 presents summary statistics and additional statistical tests corre-
sponding to each of the histograms. Specically, the table shows the mean,
the median, the skewness, and the ratio of positive to negative dividend
changes and forecast errors. It further reports test statistics for tests of the
null hypothesis that the mean is zero and the null hypothesis that posi-
tive and negative dividend changes and forecast errors are equally likely.
Columns 1—5 of the table report results for the complete sample (winsorized
at the 1st and 99th percentile), while columns 6—10 report results for a
trimmed sample that only contains absolute dividend changes and forecast
errors between -10 cents and +10 cents and percentage dividend changes and
forecast errors between -10% and +10%, respectively. Thus, columns 6—10
are based on the same data as the histograms (but remember that zero div-
idend changes and zero forecast errors are excluded from the histograms,
while they are included in the summary statistics presented in Table 2.3.1).
We start with the results for absolute dividend changes (see Figure 2.3.1).
Small dividend increases are far more frequent than small decreases. A one
cent dividend increase is about twice as likely as a one cent decrease. These
results hold both for the full sample (Panel A) and for the restricted sam-
ple (Panel B). When we move from absolute dividend changes to percentage
changes (Figure 2.3.2), we obtain very similar results. Small percentage in-
creases are far more frequent than small percentage decreases. Moreover,
the test statistic of the Degeorge et al. (1999) discontinuity test is positive
negative values. If we include the zeros, the test clearly indicates a discontinuity at zero.
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for both samples and signicant for the restricted sample, supporting the
evidence that there are more small dividend increases than decreases. The
histograms thus provide clear support for hypothesis 1. Our conclusion on
hypothesis 1 is further supported by the summary statistics presented in
Table 2.3.1. In all four samples (full and restricted, complete and trimmed
samples) the mean dividend change is signicantly larger than zero. Divi-
dend increases far outnumber decreases. The null hypothesis that positive
and negative dividend changes are equally likely is clearly rejected.
We obtain a much more dierentiated picture when we consider absolute
dividend forecast errors (Figure 2.3.3). The most frequent category is small
(1 cent or less) negative forecast errors.8 Negative forecast errors larger than
one cent are rare. We get a dierent picture on the right-hand side of the
gure. While small (one cent or less) positive forecast errors are much less
frequent than similar-sized negative forecast errors, larger positive forecast
errors are more frequent than larger negative forecast errors. Again, the
full sample and the restricted sample produce similar results. The summary
statistics shown in Table 2.3.1 reveal that, in the full sample, the numbers of
positive and negative observations are almost equal while in the restricted
sample there are more positive than negative forecast errors.
8Remember that zero forecast errors are excluded from the histograms. Remember also that
the forecast error is dened as the actual dividend minus the consensus forecast. A negative
forecast error thus implies that the actual dividend falls short of analyst expectations.
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Figure 2.3.1: Histograms of Absolute Dividend Changes from the Interval
[-0.10$,0$) and (0$,+0.10$] in 0.01$ Bins
Variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. The solid black line shows an appropri-
ately scaled normal density with the same mean and standard deviation as the data.
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Figure 2.3.2: Histograms of Percentage Dividend Changes from the Interval
[-0.10%,0%) and (0%,+0.10%] in 1% Bins
Variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. The tau-statistics shown in the boxes are
the t-like test statistics borrowed from Degeorge et al. (1999) which follow a standard normal
distribution. The tau-statistics are obtained using 1 percent bins, 10 bins to the left and 10 bins
to the right of the zero threshold. The solid black line shows an appropriately scaled normal
density with the same mean and standard deviation as the data.
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Figure 2.3.3: Histograms of Absolute Dividend Forecast Errors Based on Me-
dian Analysts’ Forecasts from the Interval [-0.10$,0$) and (0$,+0.10$] in 0.01$
Bins
Variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. The solid black line shows an appropri-
ately scaled normal density with the same mean and standard deviation as the data.
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Figure 2.3.4: Histograms of Percentage Dividend Forecast Errors Based on
Median Analysts’ Forecasts from the Interval [-10%,0%) and (0%,+10%] in 1%
Bins
Variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. The tau-statistics shown in the boxes are
the t-like test statistics borrowed from Degeorge et al. (1999) which follow a standard normal
distribution. The tau-statistics are obtained using 1 percent bins, 10 bins to the left and 10 bins
to the right of the zero threshold. The solid black line shows an appropriately scaled normal
density with the same mean and standard deviation as the data.
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Table 2.3.1: Distributional Properties of Dividend Changes and Forecast Errors
This table presents the distributional properties of both absolute and percentage dividend changes and dividend forecast errors. It shows the mean, the
median, the number of positive vs. negative values, and the skewness. It further shows (in parentheses) test statistics for tests of the mean against zero
and for the test of the null hypothesis that positive and negative values are equally likely. Columns 1—5 present gures for the full sample (winsorized
at the 1% and 99% quantile); columns 6—10 — for a trimmed sample that only contains small (less than 10 cents and less than 10%, respectively)
dividend changes and forecast errors. ***, **, and * denote signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Full sample (winsorized at 1% and 99%) Trimmed sample (-10 cents to +10 cents; -10% to +10%)
Mean Median Ratio pos/neg. Skewness Obs. Mean Median Ratio pos/neg. Skewness Obs.
t-statistic z-statistic t-statistic z-statistic
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Absolute Dividend Changes
Full sample 0.0029 0 10,997:3,438 -0.34 56,215 0.0032 0 9,716:2,178 1.13 53,674(12.02)*** (125.83)*** (47.75)*** (69.12)***
Restricted sample 0.0137 0.01 10,997:2,849 -0.42 13,846 0.0157 0.01 9,716:1,685 -0.39 11,401(14.50)*** (69.25)*** (58.15)*** (75.21)***
Percentage Dividend Changes
Full sample 0.96 0 10,220:3,439 -0.35 55,439 0.44 3.57 5,431:1,258 2.57 48,469(11.33)*** (58.02)*** (52.00)*** (51.02)***
Restricted sample 5.65 5.88 10,220:2,850 -0.34 13,070 3.48 0 5,431:938 -0.60 6,369(16.54)*** (64.47)*** (71.50)*** (56.30)***
Absolute Dividend Forecast Errors
Full sample 0.0013 0 9,766:9,764 1.39 65,207 0.0007 0 8,763:8,840 0.81 63,280(10.82)*** (0.01) (14.03)*** (0.58)
Restricted sample 0.0052 0 6,577:4,422 1.10 22,838 0.0028 0 5,743:3,806 0.54 21,388(16.73)*** (20.55)*** (21.56)*** (19.82)***
Percentage Dividend Forecast Errors
Full sample 0.32 0 9,219:9,764 -0.04 50,295 0.01 0 5,175:6,643 0.53 43,130(3.39)*** (3.96)*** (0.47) (13.50)***
Restricted sample 2.38 0 6,201:4,422 0.16 19,016 0.37 0 3,227:2,807 0.55 14,427(11.47)*** (17.26)*** (14.61) (5.41)***
36 To Meet or Beat Analysts’ Dividend Forecasts
Turning to percentage forecast errors, visual inspection of the histograms
(Figure 2.3.4) suggests that positive forecast errors below 5% are less fre-
quent than similarly sized negative forecast errors, while the reverse holds
for forecast errors above 5%. This is consistent with the results, discussed
above, for absolute forecast errors.9 As evidenced by the statistics shown in
Table 2.3.1, the rst eect dominates in the full sample (i.e. there are signi-
cantly more negative than positive forecast errors in the full sample), while
the second eect dominates in the restricted sample. The test statistics of
the Degeorge et al. (1999) discontinuity test for the percentage forecast er-
rors are insignicantly negative in both the full and the restricted sample.
Taken together, these results do not allow us to conclude that managers de-
liberately set dividends to meet analyst forecasts.
While our results provide clear support for hypothesis 1, they are much less
supportive of hypothesis 2. This nding is surprising against the backdrop
of the results that previous studies have documented for earnings announce-
ments. To shed more light on the issue, we have merged our data set with
data on earnings announcements and analysts’ earnings forecasts. For all
rm-quarter observations in our sample for which data was available we
calculated the percentage earnings forecast error. It is dened as the dif-
ference between actual earnings and the median analyst earnings forecast,
expressed as a percentage of the forecast. We then classify all observations
into three groups, "misses", "matches", and "beats". Following Brown (1997),
9When comparing the histograms of absolute and percentage forecast errors, it should be
kept in mind that the horizontal scales are dierent — depending on the dividend level a one
cent dividend forecast error will often translate into a much larger percentage value.
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a match is dened as a case in which the actual earnings gure is within
+/- 10% of the forecasts. Misses and beats are dened correspondingly. For
each observation we further record whether the actual dividend was equal
to the median analyst forecast, ["match"], larger than the forecast, ["beat"],
or smaller than the forecast, ["miss"]. We then cross-tabulate the two group-
ings separately for the full sample and the restricted sample. The results are
shown in Table 2.3.2.
In the full sample (Panel A of Table 2.3.2) cases in which actual earnings ex-
ceed forecasted earnings by more than the 10% threshold we apply are much
more common than cases in which earnings fall short of the forecast (28.7%
as compared to 17.8%). This does not apply to dividends. Here, "misses" and
"beats" are equally likely (15.3% as compared to 15.7%). This pattern is con-
sistent with the notion that managers try to beat analysts’ earnings forecasts
but do not try to beat their dividend forecasts. The results for the restricted
sample (Panel B of Table 2.3.2) dier from those for the full sample. Here,
the percentage of "beats" is larger than the percentage of "misses" both for
the earnings announcements (28.2% as compared to 18.4%) and for the div-
idend announcements (30.0% as compared to 19.3%). These results thus do
not provide unanimous support for the conjecture that managers disregard
analysts’ dividend forecasts.
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Table 2.3.2: Joint Distribution of Earnings and Dividend Forecast Errors
The sample for the analysis in Panel A (Panel B) was created by merging the full sample (restricted sample) with I/B/E/S same quarter data on analysts’
median earnings forecasts and quarterly earnings per share. We identify "misses" of dividend forecasts if the quarterly dividend per share is smaller
than the median analyst dividend forecast. We identify "matches" of dividend forecasts if the quarterly dividend per share is equal to the median
analyst dividend forecast. We identify "beats" of dividend forecasts if the quarterly dividend per share is greater than the median analyst dividend
forecast. "Misses" of earnings forecasts are identied if percentage earnings forecast errors are lower than minus ten percent. "Matches" of earnings
forecasts are identied if percentage earnings forecast errors are higher than minus ten percent and lower than ten percent. "Beats" of earnings
forecast errors are identied if percentage earnings forecast errors are higher than ten percent. Percentage earnings forecast errors are the ratio of
quarterly earnings per share minus the median analyst earnings per share forecast to the median analyst earnings per share forecast, expressed in
percent.
Panel A. Full sample merged with earnings data
Earnings announcements
misses match beats Total
Dividend announcements
misses 1,851 3.12% 4,876 8.21% 2,352 3.96% 9,079 15.29%
match 7,324 12.33% 21,411 36.05% 12,248 20.62% 40,983 69.00%
beats 1,373 2.31% 5,492 9.25% 2,471 4.16% 9,336 15.72%
Total 10,548 17.76% 31,779 53.50% 17,071 28.74% 59,398 100.00%
Panel B. Restricted sample merged with earnings data
Earnings announcements
misses match beats Total
Dividend announcements
misses 955 4.55% 2,052 9.77% 1,049 5.00% 4,056 19.32%
match 1,995 9.50% 5,473 26.07% 3,183 15.16% 10,651 50.73%
beats 905 4.31% 3,691 17.58% 1,693 8.06% 6,289 29.95%
Total 3,855 18.36% 11,216 53.42% 5,925 28.22% 20,996 100.00%
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2.4 Robustness Checks
We have conducted a number of robustness checks. First, we have repeated
the analysis using the mean analyst forecast instead of the median forecast
to calculate the dividend forecast errors. Second, we restricted the sample
to cases with at least two analyst forecasts. Third, we repeated the analysis
after excluding observations from the crisis years 2008 and 2009 from the
sample. In all three cases the results were qualitatively similar to those re-
ported in the previous section. We therefore omit the results from the paper.
Analysts start submitting forecast of the quarter t dividend in quarter t-1
and then may update their forecast throughout quarter t. I/B/E/S aggregates
analysts’ forecasts at a monthly level. Therefore, there is data available on
forecasts made one, two, three and four months before a dividend announce-
ment. In the main analysis we used the last update published prior to the
dividend announcement. To check the robustness of our ndings we repeat
the analysis using the forecasts available two, three and four months before
the announcement. The results are similar to those presented above and are
thus omitted from the paper.
2.5 Conclusion
It is a well established empirical fact that managers care about investor ex-
pectations and analyst forecasts when making earnings announcements. They
manage earnings in order to report positive prots, prots in excess of those
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reported in the previous quarter and prots that exceed analyst forecasts. We
analyze whether a similar pattern can be detected for dividend announce-
ments. Using a large sample of dividend announcements made by listed
U.S. corporations we test whether there are more small dividend increases
than small decreases, and whether there are more dividend announcements
that slightly exceed analysts’ dividend forecasts than announcements that
slightly fall short of analyst forecasts.
We nd clear support for the rst hypothesis but not for the second hy-
pothesis. Small dividend increases are signicantly more likely than small
decreases. A similar pattern does not hold for dividends relative to analyst
forecasts. Rather, we nd that dividends that fall short by one cent of the
consensus forecast are more frequent than dividends that slightly exceed the
forecast. Our results are consistent with the view that the relevant thresh-
old for dividends is the previous dividend, not the analyst forecast. It is an
interesting direction for future research to analyze why this is the case.
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Chapter Three
The Marginal Information
Content of Dividends and
Earnings
3.1 Introduction
Value eects of dividend payouts have received a great deal of attention in
corporate nance. A paper by Miller and Modigliani (Miller and Modigliani,
1961) drew a dividing line in this strand of the literature. Whereas previ-
ous studies seemed to agree on the existence of wealth eects of dividend
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announcements, Miller and Modigliani showed in a theoretical setting that
this relationship is spurious and, given earnings, dividends cannot indepen-
dently aect stock valuations. This seminal paper caused previously ob-
tained results to be reconsidered and called for a more thorough examina-
tion of dividend and earnings rm value eects. My paper adds to the lit-
erature on the information content of dividends by employing an empirical
investigation of analysts’ dividend expectations in the U.S. from the I/B/E/S
database, hitherto unexplored in this setting.
Disputes persist concerning dividend changes’ responsibility for rm value
change, as well as regarding an underlying explanatory theory. On the one
hand, the present value theory suggests rm value is related to a discounted
ow of future expected dividends (see Damodaran (2012) or an earlier text-
book by Williams (1938), see Preinreich (1932); Clendenin and Cleave (1954);
Gordon (1959) for research papers). Therefore, any unexpected dividend
change should be accompanied by a corresponding change in stock mar-
ket valuations of the rms to which this valuation method is being applied.
On the other hand, according to Miller and Modigliani (1961), a rm’s div-
idends and more generally its nancing policy are irrelevant for the rm’s
value. The authors argue that what matters instead is a rm’s ability to earn
money and the risk it bears. In other words, earnings is a key parameter
that is responsible for investors’ appraisal of a rm, whereas dividends are
not. Therefore, stock prices should not adjust to changes in a rm payout.
Even if any rm value eects around dividend policy changes are empiri-
cally observed, then these indicate updated beliefs of market participants on
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noise-free earnings. This conclusion from Modigliani and Miller (1959) rests
on the assumption that dividends have a potential to signal to the market
the real unobservable earnings.
Despite a subsequent critique of the model’s assumptions and implications,
Miller and Modigliani sent an important message that conclusive results
achieved by any empirical investigation of a payout policy’s eect on stock
prices, if any, is contingent on the consideration of rm earnings. I provide
a number of tests that aim to isolate potential contemporaneous earnings
eects on stock prices. In particular, I attempt to answer the question of
whether dividends have an eect on a stock price independent of that of
earnings. I contribute to the discussion using an underexploited identi-
cation strategy approximating market expectations with analysts’ dividend
expectations available from I/B/E/S.
Despite a long tradition of estimating the wealth eects of dividends, test
results are still inconclusive. Most of the earlier eorts in empirical research
were in favor of a dividend policy eect on stock prices (Fama et al., 1969;
Pettit, 1972, 1976; Charest, 1978; Aharony and Swary, 1980; Woolridge, 1983;
Handjinicolaou and Kalay, 1984; Eades et al., 1985; Asquith and Mullins,
1986; Lang and Litzenberger, 1989; Bajaj and Vijh, 1990; Dhillon and John-
son, 1994; Leftwich and Zmijewski, 1994; Yoon and Starks, 1995; Grullon
et al., 2002; Andres et al., 2013). Watts (1973) refutes this premise. Gonedes
(1978) and Amihud and Li (2006) also fail to support the hypothesis. In light
of these conicting ndings, I revisit the topic of the information content of
dividends.
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The major problem in empirical tests of the dividends information content
hypothesis is an inability to observe unexpected changes in dividends.1 This
was recognized as early as in the 1980s in Easterbrook (1984), where the au-
thor asserts: “These [consequences of dividends] are hard to evaluate, for it is
hard to obtain a measure of unanticipated changes in the level of dividends,
and only unanticipated changes could change the prices of shares.” Thus,
distinct dividend expectation models may be accountable for the mixed re-
sults on the validity of the information hypothesis. The existing literature,
including the references listed above, estimates stock market eects using
dividend decreases and increases as a measure of the unexpected dividend
change.2 This approach implicitly assumes constant dividends as a model
of market expectations. A serious drawback of this naïve model is that an
absolute dividend change contains some anticipated component. The model
does not allow for updates in market beliefs in a period between subsequent
dividend announcements, which clearly contradicts observable adjustments
in analysts’ estimates and recommendations.
In this paper I show that I/B/E/S analysts’ consensus dividend forecasts rep-
resent a superior model of future dividends than naïve forecasts and en-
courage its implementation as a proxy for market expectations.3 To the best
1Another empirical issue with a test of the dividend information hypothesis briey men-
tioned above is that dividend announcements are often accompanied by earnings announce-
ments. Therefore, an identication strategy that omits this factor risks falsely attributing an
earnings information eect to that of the dividend.
2Another widely-used proxy for unexpected dividends is derived from Lintner’s partial ad-
justment model in which a dividend change is a function of current earnings and lagged divi-
dends (see Lintner (1956) and its modications as in Fama and Babiak (1968)). The naïve model
is found to oer a weaker description of dividends behavior than the Lintner model (Fama and
Babiak, 1968).
3Brown and Roze (1978); Fried and Givoly (1982) use analysts’ earnings estimates from
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of my knowledge, the only paper that uses analysts’ expectations from the
I/B/E/S database in the dividends context, although on the German market,
is by Andres et al. (2013). In drawing parallels to this study, though, attention
should be paid to the existence of a dierent information and institutional
environment in Germany, where dividends are paid once a year.4 A large
sample of analysts’ dividend forecasts is available with the I/B/E/S database
starting from 2002, which may explain why this intuitive proxy for market
expectations has not been extensively used in prior research on dividends.
Thus, using the reliable proxy for unexpected dividend changes that recently
became available and controlling for earnings capacity to convey informa-
tion allows me to contribute to the debate on the information content of
dividends.
Moreover, my paper relates to the literature on valuation models used by
stock market analysts. Contrary to the previously mentioned research which
develops stock valuation models, researchers in this eld study which of
the theoretical models are being implemented for business purposes. Barker
(1999) conducts a survey of UK fund managers and analysts and nds that
price to earnings and dividend yield multiples are the most used valuation
models in practice, whereas dividend discount models are disregarded by
nance professionals. Still, most of the existing studies in this area show
that the price-earnings ratio is dominant in pricing stock assets (Arnold and
Value Line and Earnings Forecaster to show that these better portray earnings than time-series
models.
4Woolridge (1983) approximates market dividend expectations with analysts’ forecasts from
Value Line, an investment advisory rm. However, this sample is limited to only 367 observa-
tions. Most importantly, this study does not control for the earnings surprise.
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Moizer, 1984; Previts et al., 1994; Bradshaw, 2002; Demirakos et al., 2004).
Although my paper does not study which valuation methods correctly es-
timate rm value, it provides an empirical analysis suitable to answer the
question of whether the dividend discount model is prevalent in stock valu-
ation among stock market professionals.
A quick glance at the data reveals that dividend news does not cause in-
vestors to reconsider their stock valuations. In the samples where dividends
and earnings announcements occur on the same day, the market goes to-
gether with a sign of earnings news even when dividend news is dierently
signed. Cumulative abnormal returns around dividend news suciently iso-
lated in time from earnings news are not signed in line with expectations
and are not statistically signicant. Although these results are robust to the
choice of test statistic, denition of a news event, and across subsamples,
they do not consider share repurchases and thus may not be generalizable
to the broader payout policy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.2 I describe my
sample selection and the construction of key variables. Section 3.3 provides
relevant descriptive statistics. Section 3.4 includes tests of the marginal in-
formational content of dividends and earnings. Finally, Section 3.5 draws
conclusions.
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3.2 Data Selection and Variables
For the purpose of this analysis, I dene two measures to classify dividend
and earnings announcements as a negative, positive or no news event, namely,
absolute and relative forecast errors. To group observations into these sub-
samples, I rst compute dividend forecast errors (DFERR), that is, a signed
dierence between an actual value of dividend per share (DPS) and its mean
analyst estimate. I identify positive (negative) dividend news, for the pos-
itive (negative) domain of analysts’ forecast errors when dividend forecast
errors (DFERR) are greater (smaller) than or equal to the median of posi-
tive (negative) analysts’ dividend forecast errors (median DFERR). Analysts’
dividend forecast errors below the median values of positive forecast errors
and above the median values of negative forecast errors are classied as no
dividend news observations. Analogously, I compute earnings forecast er-
rors (EFERR) and identify negative, positive, and no earnings news (ENEWS
negative, ENEWS positive, ENEWS zero).
The second measure used to partition the sample into negative news, no
news, and positive news subsamples is relative forecast errors. Its calcula-
tion is similar to that of the absolute forecast error described above except
that I scale dividend and earnings prediction errors (DFERR and EFERR) by
price. In order to avoid picking up the eect of leaking information, I choose
the stock price ten business days before an announcement date.5 I iden-
5In the earnings management literature, forecast errors are deated by the beginning of
quarter t stock price (Brown and Caylor (2005), Bartov et al. (2002)), scaled by the stock price ten
days before the announcement (Berkman and Truong (2009)), or by actual quarterly earnings.
The Marginal Information Content of Dividends and Earnings 53
tify positive (negative) dividend news, DNEWS positive (DNEWS negative),
for the positive (negative) domain of analysts’ prediction errors when the
scaled dividend forecast errors (SDFERR) are greater (smaller) than or equal
to the median of scaled positive (negative) analysts’ dividend forecast er-
rors (median SDFERR). Scaled analysts’ dividend prediction errors below the
median values of scaled positive forecast errors and above the median val-
ues of scaled negative forecast errors are classied as no dividend news ob-
servations (DNEWS zero). Analogously, I compute earnings forecast errors
(EFERR), scaled earnings forecast errors (SEFERR) and next identify nega-
tive, positive, or no earnings surprise (ENEWS negative, ENEWS positive,
ENEWS zero).6 Using relative forecast errors allows me to account for the
economic signicance of a news event. Additionally, I use the absolute fore-
cast error denition as a robustness check.
To construct my main variables, I use data from several sources. Data on
analysts’ expectations of quarterly dividends and earnings and their actual
values are obtained from the I/B/E/S Summary U.S. forecasts le, and stock
price data from the quarterly les of the CRSP-Compustat Merged. I source
rm nancial data from Compustat.
A universe of I/B/E/S analysts’ estimates contains 686,297 rm-quarter-dividend
and rm-quarter-earnings forecasts made for the next quarter. Due to the
fact that analysts may stop and resume covering some rms, the data is frag-
6In this paper I use terms "news" and "surprise" interchangeably. Another way to dene
earnings surprises used in the earnings literature is to compare the forecast error to some ref-
erence point, for example, 10 percent bandwidth. Unlike the earnings literature, I consider both
dividend and earnings surprises, and applying the same bandwidth to dividends would leave
me with an insucient number of observations. I therefore use a median threshold.
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mented. The sampling period starts in January 2002 because of the rst ap-
pearance of the dividend forecasts in that year, and extends to December
2012. Every month up to the forecast period end, I/B/E/S updates analysts’
estimates. Among these monthly updates I select only the nal ones prior
to the earnings or dividend announcements. This way I exclude another
450,190 data points and I am left with 236,107 observations. I drop observa-
tions with no historical CUSIPs available. I further require data on realised
dividend per share (DPS) and earnings per share (EPS) to be available, as
well as their announcement dates. The last lter is needed to identify con-
founding earnings and dividend events, as described below.
For the main analysis, I collapse my I/B/E/S sample to rm-quarter observa-
tions where dividends and earnings disclosures are bundled simultaneously
in a single announcement. This leaves me with 37,722 same day dividend and
earnings announcements for 3,308 individual rms. To obtain relative fore-
cast errors from this sample, I further need to scale them by stock prices on
the tenth business day before an announcement. The latter is obtained from
the CRSP-Compustat Merged database. Scaling reduces the sample to 37,395
observations for 3,247 individual rms due to missing stock price informa-
tion in Compustat records (see Table 3.2.1). Some rms have stock price
information around a disclosure, but not precisely on the tenth business day
before an announcement. In these cases, I take the share price from the most
recent day previous to the tenth day before an announcement when the se-
curity had a valid price. Four iterations are sucient to nd stock prices for
all 114 observations, for which no data are found on the tenth business day
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preceding an announcement.
Subsequently, I obtain cumulative abnormal returns (CARs). Abnormal stock
returns are computed based on one-factor market model residuals estimated
by ordinary least squares from day -252 to day -2 with CRSP equally-weighted
index returns. Since I require a minimum of 250 days of return data, the ac-
tual number of observations available for further analysis (see rows CARs in
Table 3.2.1) is smaller than the initial number of dividend and earnings news
events (see rows Obs. in Table 3.2.1).
I use three parametric and two non-parametric tests to test signicance of
CARs. I perform the Patell test, the cross-sectional and the standardized
cross-sectional tests. For the non-parametric, the generalized sign test (Cowan
test) and the rank tests (Corrado test) are carried out. Event windows are se-
lected to account for leaking information.7
For an additional analysis, I also obtain subsamples with non-concurring
earnings and dividend news. To be included in these subsamples, dividend
and earnings announcements should occur with a time lag of at least one
day and should constitute a positive or negative news event, according to
the forecast error denition described above. A dierent subsample of non-
concurring earnings and dividend news consists of dividend news that is
7Acker and Duck (2009) raise a concern with regards to the time-stamp errors in earnings
announcements. They found a signicant percent of I/B/E/S earnings announcement dates to
be later than the true date when compared to the hand-collected data. This mislabelling may
bias parameter estimates towards zero and lead to the signicant returns before an earnings
announcement to be falsely attributed to the information leakage. I obtain signicant CARs
around earnings announcements. This might be due to the fact that, according to the authors,
Thomson Reuters has veried and corrected their earnings time stamps for European rms and
at the publication date of their paper were about to start the same project for the U.S. rms.
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neither preceded by earnings announcements less than three days before,
nor followed by earnings announcements less than three days after.8 This
way I am able to isolate a market response to dividends in an event study set-
ting. The three days before a dividend announcement restriction precludes
an earnings spillover eect. The three days after a dividend announcement
restriction helps to ensure that there is no leaking earnings information yet
which can be priced. I use two subsamples with negative and positive divi-
dend news obtained using absolute forecast errors. I do not scale prediction
errors in order to avoid a further thinning of the sample due to the missing
stock price information.
Also for the subsamples with non-concurring events, I obtain CARs. Here I
estimate one-factor market model residuals with ordinary least squares for
an estimation window of 250 days starting two days before an announce-
ment. Since I require a minimum of 250 days of return data for parame-
ter estimation, I am not able to generate CARs for some events. Table 3.2.2
demonstrates how many observations are included in the samples with non-
concurring news events and used for an analysis in Section 3.4.1.
Analysts’ dividend expectations is a more precise proxy for the market ex-
pectations than the naïve model commonly employed in the literature. A
major drawback of the naïve model is that it does not account for updates in
the market beliefs since the previous quarter dividend distributions. This is
demonstrated in Table 3.2.3, where I compare forecast errors when a naïve
8Ofer and Siegel (1987) use a twelve-day window. Dhillon et al. (2003) use 2 days prior to
and 5 days after dividend announcements.
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model is applied, as well as analysts’ point estimates. To obtain forecast er-
rors for the naïve model using I/B/E/S, I need to assign actual dividends to
quarters. For that I merge the I/B/E/S quarterly le with an annual le, which
contains a calendar month of a rm’s scal year. From Table 3.2.3, Panel A,
we learn that analysts’ forecast errors are smaller than those obtained with
a naïve model. The t-test from the same table, Panel B conrms that mean
forecast errors of a naïve model and analysts’ forecasts are statistically sig-
nicantly dierent.
Moreover, stock market analysts’ estimates and recommendations form, to
a great extent, opinions of other market participants. It is largely their rec-
ommendations that are used by less sophisticated investors to assess compa-
nies’ future earnings and dividend streams and price stocks accordingly; it is
their estimates that support trading by institutional investors (Malmendier
and Shanthikumar, 2014).
Still, from the earnings forecasting literature, we know that analysts are gen-
erally overoptimistic, which is explained by cognitive biases or by their in-
centives to generate trading volume to support aliated investment bank-
ing or mutual fund activities (Firth et al., 2013). Moreover, management
guidance may have meetable and beatable forecasts as a consequence (Mat-
sumoto, 2002; Richardson et al., 2004; Cotter et al., 2006). It follows that true
market expectations might deviate from those of analysts.
If analysts exhibit biases with dividend estimates as with those of earnings,
this might have certain implications for the validity of analysts’ expectations
as a model of market expectations. In this case analysts’ dividend projections
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may be a biased estimate of market expectations in two directions predicted
in the earnings literature. On the one hand, analysts may issue downward
biased forecasts, which are easy to meet or beat. Then, in the case of a neg-
ative forecast error (a negative absolute dierence between a realized and
a forecasted dividend value), the absolute value of the true forecast error is
larger than the absolute value of the empirically observed one. This way,
the size of the empirically observed negative analysts’ forecast error will,
on average, underestimate the true stock market forecast error (that is, the
true negative forecast error is more negative than the observed one). On the
other hand, one may follow the trade generation logic and conjecture that
analysts publish DPS estimates larger than their true expectations. In this
case, the true positive forecast error is greater than the empirically observed
one. It follows that the empirically observed positive analysts’ forecast error
will, on average, underestimate the true stock market forecast error.
This potentially signicant concern about the validity of the proposed mar-
ket expectations model, if any applies, is not very pronounced in my sample.
As evident from Table 3.2.3, I nd that the dividend forecast error is of an
economically insignicant positive value for the whole sample and it is equal
to 0.002 USD when restricting the sample with contemporaneous dividend
and earnings announcements to non-zero dividend forecast errors (DFERR
is winsorized at the upper and lower 1% levels). Therefore, if same biases ap-
ply to analysts’ dividends forecasts, then in my sample analysts are neither
systematically providing too positive forecasts, nor do they systematically
adjust forecasts for managers to easily beat.
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Moreover, it has been shown in the earnings literature that the market is able
to factor in the biases that analysts may have when pricing the stocks. For
example, Jegadeesh and Kim (2010) show that the market reaction is stronger
for stock downgrades than upgrades in a sample of analysts’ recommenda-
tion revisions from 1993 to 2006. Moreover, in their recent study, Hilary and
Hsu (2013) demonstrate that analysts are consistent in their forecast errors
so that investors may reliably adjust their forecasts by a certain number of
cents.
3.3 Descriptive Statistics
In this section I describe statistical properties of the four subsamples tabu-
lated and used in the main analysis. Table 3.3.1 provides relevant statistics.
Mean dividend forecast errors (DFERR) range from -0.34 USD in the port-
folio with both negative dividend and earnings surprises to 0.30 USD in the
portfolio with negative earnings and positive dividend surprises, as shown
in Table 3.3.1. The median dividend forecast errors are more moderate, being
equal to only -0.02 USD and 0.03 USD for the negative and positive dividend
surprise subsamples, respectively. Mean absolute dividend forecast errors
are smaller than those for earnings in all four portfolios.
To understand how economically signicant these prediction errors are, I
scale the forecast errors by the stock price on the tenth day before an an-
nouncement. Table 3.3.1 shows that median values of both scaled dividend
and earnings forecast errors (SDFERR and SEFERR) are of low magnitudes,
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Table 3.2.1: Samples Formation with Contemporaneous Dividend and Earn-
ings Announcements
This table describes main procedures in the construction of the subsamples with dividends and
earnings announcements occurring on the same day. Rel. FERR andAbs. FERR stand for absolute
and relative forecast errors, which are used to partition dividend and earnings announcements
into negative, positive, or no news subsamples. Minus and plus signs indicate negative (actual
dividends lower than prognoses) and positive (actual dividends higher than prognoses) news
respectively. Obs. refers to the total number of observations available after lters described
in the text. CARs stands for the subsamples of simultaneous dividend and earnings announce-
ments for which there is sucient stock price information to compute cumulative abnormal
returns.
Rel. FERR DNEWS(-) DNEWS(-) DNEWS(-) Total
ENEWS(-) No ENEWS ENEWS(+) DNEWS(-)
Obs. 633 1,536 835 3,004
CARs 595 1,489 807 2,891
Abs. FERR DNEWS(-) DNEWS(-) DNEWS(-) Total
ENEWS(-) No ENEWS ENEWS(+) DNEWS(-)
Obs. 449 839 581 1,869
CARs 421 808 561 1,790
Rel. FERR No DNEWS No DNEWS No DNEWS Total
ENEWS(-) No ENEWS ENEWS(+) No DNEWS
Obs. 4,622 17,276 9,266 31,164
CARs 4,493 17,008 9,039 30,540
Abs. FERR No DNEWS No DNEWS No DNEWS Total
ENEWS(-) No ENEWS ENEWS(+) No DNEWS
Obs. 5,665 16,569 10,572 32,806
CARs 5,523 16,245 10,363 32,131
Rel. FERR DNEWS(+) DNEWS(+) DNEWS(+) Total
ENEWS(-) No ENEWS ENEWS(+) DNEWS(+)
Obs. 463 1,784 977 3,224
CARs 445 1,753 935 3,133
Abs. FERR DNEWS(+) DNEWS(+) DNEWS(+) Total
ENEWS(-) No ENEWS ENEWS(+) DNEWS(+)
Obs. 426 1,304 990 2,720
CARs 409 1,281 956 2,646
Rel. FERR Total ENEWS(-) Total No ENEWS Total ENEWS(+) Total
Obs. 5,718 20,596 11,078 37,392
CARs 5,497 20,250 10,781 36,564
Abs. FERR Total ENEWS(-) Total No ENEWS Total ENEWS(+) Total
Obs. 6,540 18,712 12,143 37,395
CARs 6,353 18,334 11,880 36,567
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Table 3.2.2: Samples Formation with Non-Contemporaneous Dividend and
Earnings Announcements
This table describes main procedures in the construction of the subsamples with dividends
and earnings announcements occurring on dierent days. FERR stands for the forecast error
denition, which is used to partition dividend and earnings announcements into negative and
positive news subsamples. Minus and plus signs indicate negative (actual dividends lower than
prognoses) and positive (actual dividends higher than prognoses) news respectively. Obs. refers
to the total number of observations available after lters described in the text. CARs stands
for the subsamples of simultaneous dividend and earnings announcements for which there is
sucient stock price information to compute cumulative abnormal returns.
Panel 1A. Earnings after dividends
FERR ENEWS(-) ENEWS(+) Total
Obs. 1,281 1,580 2,861
CARs 1,203 1,496 2,699
Panel 1B. Earnings after dividends in at least three days
FERR ENEWS(-) ENEWS(+) Total
Obs. 1,278 1,577 2,855
CARs 1,200 1,493 2,693
Panel 2A. Dividends after earnings
FERR DNEWS(-) DNEWS(+) Total
Obs. 918 1044 1,962
CARs 799 933 1,732
Panel 2B. Dividends after earnings in at least three days
FERR DNEWS(-) DNEWS(+) Total
Obs. 370 405 775
CARs 313 342 655
Panel 3. Dividends after and before earnings at
at least three days lag
FERR DNEWS(-) DNEWS(+) Total
Obs. 351 363 714
CARs 212 238 450
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Table 3.2.3: Comparison of Mean Analyst and Naïve Forecast Errors
Panel A provides descriptive statistics on the size of forecast errors with the naïve model and
by analysts (both mean and median analysts’ forecasts are considered). A naïve forecast error
is dened as a current quarter dividend minus a previous quarter dividend. Analysts’ forecast
errors are dened as a mean (third column) and median (fourth column) analyst forecast minus
the actual dividend. The last column reports t-tests for dierences in means. * indicates t-test
is signicant at the 10% level. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile.
Panel A. Forecast errors descriptive statistics
Forecast errors
Naïve Analyst (mean) Analyst (median)
Obs. 56,765 66,339 66,339
Mean 0.003 0.001 0.001
Median 0 0 0
Std. 0.057 0.034 0.032
Min -0.320 -0.180 -0.160
Max 0.318 0.200 0.200
Panel B. Mean-comparison test of the forecast errors
Naïve-Analyst (mean) 0.0016
t-stat 7.28***
Naïve-Analyst (median) 0.0014
t-stat 6.50***
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being in absolute terms smaller than 1% in all four subsamples. Scaled earn-
ings forecast errors are greater in mean values, with a wider range than div-
idends: scaled dividend forecast errors range in absolute terms from 0.78%
to 3.74%, whereas earnings range from 1.20% to 10.51%.
Table 3.3.2 provides descriptive statistics for the subsamples from Panels
1A—2B in Table 3.2.2. These statistics are instructive on how dividend and
earnings announcements are distributed over time. As expected, and similar
to Aharony and Swary (1980), these tend to be dividend announcements that
are made after earnings announcements rather than vice versa. Dividends
follow earnings news quite closely, in about 2 days (5 days a mean value)
in the whole sample (see Table 3.3.2, Panel 2A). In Panel 2B, in order to in-
vestigate value eects of dividends, I exclude dividend news that happens
less than three days after earnings because it is potentially more severely
aected by the spillover eects of earnings news. The median number of
days that separate a dividend announcement from a preceding earnings an-
nouncement amounts to 6 days. From Panel 1A we learn that earnings usu-
ally follow much later after dividends, with a median value of 86 days (a
mean value of 81 days), which is close to the length of one quarter. Statis-
tics from Panel 1B, which excludes cases where earnings were announced
almost right after dividends, are close to those from Panel 1A for the rea-
son that there are few such cases and the resulting subsample is not very
dierent from the initial one.
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Table 3.3.1: Descriptive Statistics of Forecast Errors in Four Subsamples
This table provides descriptive statistics relevant for an event study with four portfolios using an announcement day surprise denition. It reports
magnitudes of forecast errors and the number of observations in four portfolios for which scaling prices are available.
Rel. EFERR negative Rel. EFERR positive
DFERR EFERR SDFERR SEFERR DFERR EFERR SDFERR SEFERR
Rel. DFERR Obs. 633 835
negative Mean -0.34 -0.52 -2.07% -10.51% -0.17 0.18 -1.09% 1.75%
Median -0.02 -0.11 -0.13% -0.62% -0.02 0.08 -0.08% 0.36%
Std.deviation 3.83 4.82 0.14 0.88 1.94 0.48 0.08 0.11
Min, % -74.000 -119.680 -2.453 -19.057 -54.000 0.010 -1.716 0.001
Max, % -0.002 -0.010 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 7.860 0.000 2.623
Rel. DFERR Obs. 463 977
positive Mean 0.30 -0.31 3.74% -2.42% 0.16 0.20 0.78% 1.20%
Median 0.03 -0.11 0.13% -0.52% 0.03 0.09 0.10% 0.32%
Std.deviation 3.28 0.98 0.55 0.10 1.00 0.76 0.06 0.07
Min, % -0.02 -14.11 0.00 -1.58 -0.080 -0.120 0.000 0.001
Max, % 68.700 0.260 11.684 -0.002 26.420 20.330 1.702 1.438
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Table 3.3.2: Time Lag Between Non-Concurring Earnings and Dividend
News
This table provides statistics on a number of days outstanding from a dividend to an earnings
announcement (Panel 1) and from an earnings to a dividend announcement (Panel 2), which
constitutes a positive or negative news event. Absolute forecast errors are used to classify
an event as a positive or negative news. Panel 1A provides statistics for earnings following
dividend announcements by no more than 92 days. Panel 1B provides statistics for earnings
following dividend announcements by no fewer than 3 days and no more than 92 days. Panel
2A stands for the cases where dividends follow earnings by no more than 92 days. Panel 2B
stands for the cases where dividends follow earnings by no fewer than 3 days and no more than
92 days.
Panel 1A. Earnings after dividends
Obs. Mean Median Std. Min Max
2,861 80.8 86 13.3 1 92
Panel 1B. Earnings after dividends in at least three days
Obs. Mean Median Std. Min Max
2,855 81.0 86 12.8 10 92
Panel 2A. Dividends after earnings
Obs. Mean Median Std. Min Max
1,962 5.1 2 9.4 1 91
Panel 2B. Dividends after earnings in at least three days
Obs. Mean Median Std. Min Max
775 10.8 6 13.1 4 91
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Univariate Analysis of Price Reaction to Dividend
Announcements
I rst approach the question of the information content of dividends in that
I measure cumulative abnormal returns around dividend announcements
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(CARs). For that purpose, I consider dividend declarations that may coin-
cide with the earnings announcements but do not necessarily do so. I obtain
samples with negative and positive dividend news from the I/B/E/S database
using absolute and relative dividend forecast errors (for a reference to these
samples’ construction see Table 3.2.1, boxes Total DNEWS(-)/DNEWS(+)). If
dividends were to drive stock market returns, then in the panel of dividend
news (see Table 3.4.1) we should nd signicant CARs for both positive
and negative announcements. Moreover, given that negative dividend sur-
prises should make rational market participants adjust prices downwards,
we would expect to nd negative CARs.
Contrary to predictions, I obtain positive returns across both specications
of negative dividend news and across all event windows. Also, tests do not
uniformly indicate a signicance of stock market abnormal returns. In Panel
A, Table 3.4.1, CARs(-1,1) are not signicant for negative or positive dividend
announcements based on three out of ve tests. In Panel B of the same table,
negative dividend news is not accompanied by any statistically signicant
changes in stock price for the three-day event window according to all ve
tests.
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Table 3.4.1: Cumulative Abnormal Returns Around Positive and Negative Dividend Announcements
This table provides cumulative abnormal returns for ve event windows as well as extensive tests statistics. In Panel A absolute forecast errors are
used to partition the sample into positive and negative dividend announcements. In Panel B relative forecast errors are applied to obtain positive
and negative dividend announcements. The second columns in each window show the number of events with positive and negative compounded
abnormal returns. The third columns show mean cumulative abnormal returns in the rst and median cumulative abnormal returns in the second
row. The following tests are shown: the generalized sign test, the Patell test, the standardized cross-sectional (or Boehmer, Musumesi and Poulsen)
test, the cross-sectional standard deviation and the rank tests. P-values are in parentheses. The generalized sign test signicance levels are given in
the second columns. The symbols (,<,, or ),>,, show the direction and generic one-tail signicance of the generalized sign test at the 0.10, 0.05,
0.01 and 0.001 levels, respectively.
Panel A. Dividend news using absolute forecast errors
Total DNEWS(-) Total DNEWS(+)
Event win-
dow
Obs. CAR Patell BMP CSectErr Corrado Obs. CAR Patell BMP CSectErr Corrado
(-1,0) 1,790 0.27% 2.586 1.427 1.831 1.102 2,646 0.07% 0.966 0.532 0.678 0.973
911:879) (0.0097) (0.1535) (0.0672) (0.2716) 1325:1321 (0.3339) (0.5944) (0.4979) (0.3313)
(-1,+1) 1,790 0.37% 2.256 1.074 1.663 0.469 2,646 0.24% 3.606 1.808 1.692 1.408
913:877) (0.0241) (0.2827) (0.0963) (0.6394) 1356:1290> (0.0003) (0.0706) (0.0906) (0.1601)
(-1,+3) 1,790 0.31% 0.847 0.469 1.332 -0.406 2,646 0.26% 1.813 1.050 1.355 -0.241
907:883 (0.3971) (0.6392) (0.1827) (0.6848) 1311:1335 (0.0699) (0.2938) (0.1755) (0.8097)
(-1,+5) 1,790 0.30% 1.065 0.675 1.257 -0.176 2,646 0.23% 1.092 0.713 1.235 -1.093
914:876) (0.2870) (0.5000) (0.2098) (0.8607) 1309:1337 (0.2749) (0.4760) (0.2168) (0.2755)
(-1,+14) 1,790 0.17% 0.134 0.111 0.615 -0.047 2,646 0.22% 1.659 1.374 0.907 -0.256
893:897 (0.8935) (0.9119) (0.5386) (0.9629) 1301:1345 (0.0971) (0.1694) (0.3645) (0.7984)
Panel B. Dividend news using relative forecast errors
Total DNEWS(-) Total DNEWS(+)
Event win-
dow
Obs. CAR Patell BMP CSectErr Corrado Obs. CAR Patell BMP CSectErr Corrado
(-1,0) 2,891 0.18% 2.273 1.322 1.715 0.510 3,133 0.12% 2.398 1.345 1.315 1.918
1442:1449 (0.0230) (0.1860) (0.0864) (0.6103) 1584:1549> (0.0165) (0.1786) (0.1884) (0.0561)
(-1,+1) 2,891 0.19% 1.245 0.616 1.179 -0.205 3,133 0.28% 4.494 2.279 2.158 1.894
1444:1447 (0.2131) (0.5381) (0.2383) (0.8379) 1608:1525 (<.0001) (0.0226) (0.0309) (0.0592)
(-1,+3) 2,891 0.17% 0.866 0.491 0.997 -0.380 3,133 0.33% 2.992 1.753 1.904 0.632
1446:1445 (0.3864) (0.6231) (0.3190) (0.7039) 1569:1564 (0.0028) (0.0795) (0.0569) (0.5277)
(-1,+5) 2,891 0.14% 0.851 0.542 0.756 -0.235 3,133 0.26% 1.932 1.279 1.567 -0.266
1461:1430) (0.3950) (0.5877) (0.4494) (0.8143) 1562:1571 (0.0534) (0.2007) (0.1171) (0.7904)
(-1,+14) 2,891 0.06% 0.652 0.528 0.257 -0.441 3,133 0.24% 2.076 1.746 1.103 0.078
1431:1460 (0.5144) (0.5977) (0.7975) (0.6594) 1546:1587 (0.0379) (0.0809) (0.2699) (0.9382)
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The next set of results helps reconcile whether concurrent dividend and
earnings announcements rather than dividends alone explain stock price
changes9. To be classied as concurrent, dividend and earnings announce-
ments should happen on the same day. Table 3.4.2 shows CARs over ve
event windows with 0 being the combined dividend-earnings on announce-
ment day. Portfolios of unexpected dividend and earnings changes are formed
using relative forecast errors. The left-hand side portfolios and the right-
hand side portfolios have negative and positive earnings surprises respec-
tively. The two upper portfolios and the lower portfolios have negative and
positive dividend surprises respectively.
The tabulated event study results are highly statistically signicant, indicat-
ing that a combined dividend-earnings announcement indeed constitutes a
market value relevant event. The signs of the CARs in the case of conict-
ing signals allow us to speculate on their marginal power. In particular, the
CARs are signed as the dividend surprise only if the dividend signal is sup-
ported by the same sign earnings signal: in the case of negative dividend sur-
prises abnormal returns are signicantly negative only if earnings surprises
are negative as well and positive only if earnings surprises are positive. In
cases where two signals are not aligned, the market moves together with the
earnings surprise sign.10 I also consider subsamples in which one of the an-
9For the construction of these samples refer to Table 3.2.1, boxes with negatively and/or
positively signed dividend and earnings news
10As a robustness check, I repeated an event study using market-adjusted and comparison-
period abnormal returns, with CRSP equally weighted as a market index. Obtained CARs for the
portfolio with positive dividend and negative earnings news are signicantly negative. Events
from the portfolio with negative dividend and positive earnings surprises were accompanied
by signicantly positive abnormal returns, which justies earnings surprises driving market
returns, unlike dividend surprises.
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nouncements contains no market surprise. The tests indicate insignicant
results for the cases with zero earnings surprises, even when the dividend
surprise is positively or negatively signed (results not tabulated). The struc-
ture of Table 3.4.3 is identical to Table 3.4.2, except that I use absolute fore-
cast errors to partition observations into subsamples with dierently signed
news. The results found from this table qualitatively conrm those obtained
with relative forecast errors. This demonstrates again that in the absence of
an earnings surprise, dividend news does not move the market.
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Table 3.4.2: Cumulative Abnormal Returns Around Contemporaneous Earnings and Dividend Announcements Using
Relative Forecast Errors
This table provides cumulative abnormal returns for ve event windows as well as extensive tests statistics. The upper-left portfolio includes both
negative dividend and earnings news. The lower-left portfolio is comprised of positive dividend and negative earnings news. The upper-right portfolio
includes observations with negative dividend and positive earnings news. The lower-right portfolio includes observations with both positive dividend
and earnings news. The second columns in each window show the number of events with positive and negative compounded abnormal returns. The
third columns show mean cumulative abnormal returns in the rst and median cumulative abnormal returns in the second row. The following tests
are shown: the generalized sign test, the Patell test, the standardized cross-sectional (or Boehmer, Musumesi and Poulsen) test, the cross-sectional
standard deviation and the rank tests. P-values are in parentheses. The generalized sign test signicance levels are given in the second columns.
The symbols (,<,, or ),>,, show the direction and generic one-tail signicance of the generalized sign test at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels,
respectively.
DNEWS(-), ENEWS(-) DNEWS(-), ENEWS(+)
Event win-
dow
Obs. CAR Patell BMP CSectErr Corrado Event win-
dow
Obs. CAR Patell BMP CSectErr Corrado
(-1,0) 595 -1.27% -9.927 -5.301 -3.704 -4.377 (-1,0) 807 1.49% 13.083 8.036 6.913 5.631
239:356 (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0002) (<.0001) 494:313 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
(-1,+1) 595 -2.53% -18.070 -6.781 -4.236 -7.436 (-1,+1) 807 2.50% 18.989 11.021 9.833 8.258
200:395 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 536:271 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
(-1,+3) 595 -2.76% -14.917 -6.499 -4.482 -6.102 (-1,+3) 807 2.45% 14.725 9.778 8.414 6.334
205:390 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 516:291 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
(-1,+5) 595 -3.19% -13.260 -6.765 -5.439 -5.927 (-1,+5) 807 2.61% 13.293 9.789 8.185 6.015
202:393 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 523:284 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
(-1,+14) 595 -3.72% -8.801 -6.740 -5.888 -5.023 (-1,+14) 807 2.82% 9.186 7.963 6.850 4.813
208:387 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 483:324 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
DNEWS(+), ENEWS(-) DNEWS(+), ENEWS(+)
Event win-
dow
Obs. CAR Patell BMP CSectErr Corrado Event win-
dow
Obs. CAR Patell BMP CSectErr Corrado
(-1,0) 445 -1.06% -9.224 -5.260 -2.925 -3.828 (-1,0) 935 1.23% 14.792 8.329 6.788 6.688
172:273 (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0035) (0.0002) 559:376 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
(-1,+1) 445 -2.17% -15.970 -7.566 -4.295 -7.083 (-1,+1) 935 2.23% 22.196 11.687 8.150 9.229
157:288 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 620:315 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
(-1,+3) 445 -1.94% -13.081 -6.900 -2.293 -6.363 (-1,+3) 935 2.41% 18.021 11.009 7.581 7.814
146:299 (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0219) (<.0001) 597:338 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
(-1,+5) 445 -2.26% -11.118 -6.932 -3.551 -6.207 (-1,+5) 935 2.39% 14.393 9.782 6.204 6.294
155:290 (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0004) (<.0001) 589:346 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
(-1,+14) 445 -2.17% -6.502 -5.292 -3.072 -4.064 (-1,+14) 935 2.47% 10.298 8.964 4.549 4.510
166:279 (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0021) (<.0001) 566:369 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
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Table 3.4.3: Cumulative Abnormal Returns Around Contemporaneous Earnings and Dividend Announcements Using
Absolute Forecast Errors
This table provides cumulative abnormal returns for ve event windows as well as extensive tests statistics. The upper-left portfolio includes both
negative dividend and earnings news. The lower-left portfolio is comprised of positive dividend and negative earnings news. The upper-right portfolio
includes observations with negative dividend and positive earnings news. The lower-right portfolio includes observations with both positive dividend
and earnings news. The second columns in each window show the number of events with positive and negative compounded abnormal returns. The
third columns show mean cumulative abnormal returns in the rst and median cumulative abnormal returns in the second row. The following tests
are shown: the generalized sign test, the Patell test, the standardized cross-sectional (or Boehmer, Musumesi and Poulsen) test, the cross-sectional
standard deviation and the rank tests. P-values are in parentheses. The generalized sign test signicance levels are given in the second columns.
The symbols (,<,, or ),>,, show the direction and generic one-tail signicance of the generalized sign test at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels,
respectively.
DNEWS(-), ENEWS(-) DNEWS(-), ENEWS(+)
Event win-
dow
Obs. CAR Patell BMP CSectErr Corrado Event win-
dow
Obs. CAR Patell BMP CSectErr Corrado
(-1,0) 421 -1.03% -8.073 -4.306 -2.511 -3.899 (-1,0) 561 1.54% 12.154 7.134 5.887 5.943
164:257 (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0121) (0.0001) 355:206 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
(-1,+1) 421 -1.68% -12.817 -6.347 -2.333 -6.867 (-1,+1) 561 2.36% 15.835 8.869 7.959 7.583
136:285 (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0196) (<.0001) 367:194 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
(-1,+3) 421 -1.89% -10.473 -6.283 -2.732 -5.560 (-1,+3) 561 2.27% 11.622 7.490 6.675 5.714
143:278 (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0063) (<.0001) 358:203 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
(-1,+5) 421 -2.30% -9.192 -6.134 -3.647 -5.006 (-1,+5) 561 2.41% 10.114 7.200 6.284 5.165
143:278 (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0003) (<.0001) 355:206 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
(-1,+14) 421 -2.59% -6.515 -5.525 -3.998 -3.892 (-1,+14) 561 2.46% 6.529 5.502 5.094 4.219
149:272 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0001) 331:230 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
DNEWS(+), ENEWS(-) DNEWS(+), ENEWS(+)
Event win-
dow
Obs. CAR Patell BMP CSectErr Corrado Event win-
dow
Obs. CAR Patell BMP CSectErr Corrado
(-1,0) 409 -1.28% -13.227 -6.796 -3.328 -5.452 (-1,0) 956 1.02% 14.229 8.332 6.941 6.174
143:266 (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0009) (<.0001) 566:390 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
(-1,+1) 409 -1.99% -16.964 -8.341 -3.900 -7.655 (-1,+1) 956 1.83% 20.914 10.940 7.668 8.624
132:277 (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0001) (<.0001) 607:349 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
(-1,+3) 409 -1.82% -14.044 -7.530 -2.034 -6.865 (-1,+3) 956 1.98% 16.510 10.015 7.104 6.484
130:279 (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0420) (<.0001) 591:365 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
(-1,+5) 409 -2.12% -11.930 -7.399 -3.278 -6.363 (-1,+5) 956 2.02% 13.360 9.005 5.775 4.995
134:275 (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0011) (<.0001) 586:370 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
(-1,+14) 409 -1.76% -6.429 -5.239 -2.511 -3.491 (-1,+14) 956 2.04% 9.353 7.907 4.022 3.854
146:263 (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0121) (0.0006) 575:381 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0001)
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With the third set of double sort results we can demonstrate whether an
earnings eect survives a neutralization of a dividend factor. Table 3.4.4
contains the results of a double sort on dividend surprises followed by earn-
ings surprises. Observations are rst grouped into quintiles based on the
size of scaled (negative or positive) dividend forecast errors. Next, I cre-
ate decile portfolios based on the earnings surprise magnitude within each
of these dividend quintiles. Finally, a dividend neutral top decile earnings
portfolio is constructed by combining the ve top decile earnings portfolios
from within each dividend quintile (and similarly for the other nine earnings
decile portfolios). E1 stands for the earnings decile with values of the low-
est magnitude. E10 stands for the earnings decile with values of the highest
magnitude.
Panels A and B from Table 3.4.4 show an eect of positive earnings news
after the neutralization of a dividend factor. CARs are signicant across all
three event windows. As one would expect, and as also evident from Ta-
ble 3.4.4, abnormal returns are higher in the top earnings decile portfolios
compared to the lowest portfolios. A dierence in CARs between the top
ve portfolios and the lowest ve portfolios is about 8.48 percentage points
for the ve-day event window in Panel A and 7.38 percentage points for the
same event window in Panel B. Similar observations apply to Panel C, where
portfolios with the most negative earnings surprises generate negative re-
turns at considerably larger magnitudes than portfolios with a moderate size
of earnings surprise. Also in Panel D, the top ve earnings decile portfolios
are dierent from the lowest ones. Earnings are almost uniformly signi-
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cant at the 1% level after a dividend neutralization of a double sort. The only
exceptions are the largest earnings surprises in deciles nine and ten, which
produce the lowest in size and nonsignicant returns. Overall, the earnings
eect turns out to be robust to the neutralization of dividends. Hence, posi-
tive earnings news generates positive returns irrespective of the size and the
sign of the dividend surprise; furthermore, negative earnings news causes
plummeting returns independent of the dividend surprise.
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Table 3.4.4: Double Sorted Results. Dividend Neutral Earnings Portfolios
This table documents mean CARs obtained for dividend neutral earnings portfolios. Observations are grouped using scaled forecast errors. Panels
A and B present CARs on positive earnings news after dividend factor neutralization. Panels C and D contain the same results for negative earnings
news after dividend factor neutralization. E1 stands for the decile with values of the lowest magnitude. E10 stands for the decile with values of the
highest magnitude. High—Low is computed as the simple dierence between the sum of the ve highest portfolios from E6 to E10 and the sum of the
ve lowest portfolios from E1 to E5. Based on the Patell test, *, **, *** indicate p-values signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A. CARs from double sort on negative scaled dividend forecast errors and positive scaled earnings forecast errors
E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 E10 High—Low
(-1,0) 0.73%** -0.02% 0.97%*** 1.36%*** 1.63%*** 1.74%*** 1.43%*** 2.35%*** 1.18%*** 3.52%*** 5.55%
(-1,+1) 1.46%*** 0.26%* 1.85%*** 2.30%*** 2.87%*** 2.97%*** 2.65%*** 3.63%*** 2.30%*** 4.70%*** 7.51%
(-1,+3) 1.10%** 0.34%* 1.84%*** 1.82%*** 2.94%*** 2.83%*** 2.97%*** 3.00%*** 3.37%*** 4.35%*** 8.48%
Panel B. CARs from double sort on positive scaled dividend forecast errors and positive scaled dividend earnings errors
E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 E10 High-Low
(-1,0) 1.20%*** 0.20%** 1.55%*** 1.02%*** 1.22%*** 0.66%*** 0.64%*** 1.36%*** 2.17%*** 2.27%*** 1.91%
(-1,+1) 2.00%*** 0.34%*** 2.44%*** 1.97%*** 1.62%*** 1.22%*** 2.48%*** 3.02%*** 3.40%*** 3.82%*** 5.57%
(-1,+3) 1.95%*** 0.92%*** 2.27%*** 1.82%*** 1.41%*** 1.68%*** 2.83%*** 2.63%*** 3.68%*** 4.93%*** 7.38%
Panel C. CARs from double sort on negative scaled dividend forecast errors and negative scaled earnings forecast errors
E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 E10 High-Low
(-1,0) -1.39%*** -0.69%*** -1.21%*** -1.06%*** 0.25% -1.38%** -0.77% -0.07% -2.78% -3.35% *** -4.25%
(-1,+1) -2.50%*** -2.35%*** -1.89%*** -2.12%*** -1.17%*** -2.96%*** -2.18%*** 0.87%*** -5.70% -4.87% *** -4.81%
(-1,+3) -2.46%*** -2.29%*** -1.43%*** -2.36%*** -1.17%*** -3.70%*** -2.59%*** 0.53%*** -6.41% -5.29% *** -7.75%
Panel D. CARs from double sort on positive scaled dividend forecast errors and negative scaled earnings forecast errors
E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 E10 High-Low
(-1,0) -1.10%*** -0.91%* -2.31%*** -1.53%*** -0.97%*** -1.86%*** -1.38%*** -1.47%** 0.72% 0.07% 2.9%
(-1,+1) -1.26%*** -2.28%*** -4.01%*** -3.58%*** -1.90%*** -3.41%*** -2.50%*** -3.10%*** -0.30% 0.53%* 3.19%
(-1,+3) -1.22%*** -2.00%*** -4.68%*** -3.85%*** -1.51%*** -3.79%*** -2.90% *** -3.85%*** 0.31% 3.89% 4.48%
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The battery of results above is insightful for judging which rm nancial in-
formation is relevant for rm valuation. The signs of abnormal returns seem
to be driven by the sign of the earnings signal. Still, they are not sucient to
completely disregard the informativeness of the dividend signal. The next
set of results presented in Table 3.4.5 and Table 3.4.6 serves as a clean test of
whether unexpected changes in dividends are relevant for the stock market
valuation.
To construct samples from Table 3.4.5, I use my analysis of a time lag between
earnings and dividend events (for details see Table 3.2.2, Panels 1A—2B). In
Panel 2A, Table 3.4.5, I compute CARs around a dividend news event with
a distance of at least one day from an earnings announcement. Negative
dividend events are accompanied by statistically signicant negative CARs
in four of the ve event windows. However, with these results it should be
taken into consideration that dividends often follow earnings in two days
and results may be contaminated by an earnings eect. Accounting at least
in part for this potential problem, I compute CARs for only that negative div-
idend news which is not preceded by earnings news for at least three days.
Dividend news events are shown in Panel 2B to lose their signicance. At
the same time, CARs around earnings news are signicant at the 1% signi-
cance level, also when computed for the subsample where earnings are more
than three days from a dividend announcement (see Panel 1A and Panel 1B
in Table 3.4.5).
For the analysis in Table 3.4.6, I use dividend announcements separated
from earnings announcements (for details on this sample formation see Ta-
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ble 3.2.2, Panel 3). To be included in this sample, there must be no earnings
announcements within a three-day announcement window centered around
a dividend declaration event. As Table 3.4.6 indicates, only negative dividend
news events from three event windows exhibit signicant CARs; in all other
negative and positive dividend news events CARs are not signicantly dif-
ferent from zero. Overall, the results obtained do not support the notion that
any changes in dividends unexpected by the market aect rm value. The
combined evidence from the four sets of tests shows that dividend changes
do not signal changes in the rm value to the market.
3.4.2 MultivariateAnalysis of PriceReaction toDividend
Surprises
Since forecast errors may be correlated with other explanatory variables
of abnormal returns (e.g., high forecast errors negatively correlated with
rm information transparency), univariate analysis may not be sucient
to provide conclusive results. Therefore, in order to answer the question
of whether meeting and beating dividend or earnings expectations has rm
value consequences, I also model regressions controlling for rm specic
characteristics. I include rm size, rm age, investment opportunities, and
leverage as control variables. The results are provided in Table 3.4.7.
DFERRSIZE and EFERRSIZE in Table 3.4.7 stand for the size of dividend and
earnings prediction errors, computed as the simple dierence between the
actual value and its mean analysts’ estimate, including analysts’ perfect fore-
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Table 3.4.5: Cumulative Abnormal Returns Around Non-Concurring Earn-
ings and Dividend News Events
This table provides cumulative abnormal returns around non-concurring earnings and dividend
news events. Absolute forecast errors are used to classify events as containing positive or neg-
ative news. The rst row of the Obs. columns shows the total number of events with negative
(ENEWS(-)/DNEWS(-)) and positive (ENEWS(+)/DNEWS(+)) news. The second row presents the
number of positive and negative CARs in the indicated event window to the left and to the right
of the semicolon respectively. The CAR columns show mean cumulative abnormal returns and
p-values of the standardized cross-sectional test in parentheses.
Panel 1A. Earnings news after dividend news
ENEWS(-) ENEWS(+)
Event window Obs. CAR Event window Obs. CAR
(-1,0) 1,203 -1.18% (-1,0) 1,496 1.21%
506:697 (<.001) 852:644 (<.001)
(-1,+1) 1,203 -2.93% (-1,+1) 1,496 2.41%
395:808 (<.001) 925:571 (<.001)
(-1,+3) 1,203 -3.27% (-1,+3) 1,496 2.54%
400:803 (<.001) 928:568 (<.001)
(-1,+5) 1,203 -3.06% (-1,+5) 1,496 2.63%
421:782 (<.001) 925:571 (<.001)
(-1,+14) 1,203 -2.75% (-1,+14) 1,496 2.28%
462:741 (<.001) 851:645 (<.001)
Panel 1B. Earnings news after dividend news in at least three days
ENEWS(-) ENEWS(+)
Event window Obs. CAR Event window Obs. CAR
(-1,0) 1,200 -1.18% (-1,0) 1,493 1.21%
504:696 (<.001) 849:644 (<.001)
(-1,+1) 1,200 -2.93% (-1,+1) 1,493 2.41%
395:805 (<.001) 924:569 (<.001)
(-1,+3) 1,200 -3.26% (-1,+3) 1,493 2.55%
400:800 (<.001) 927:566 (<.001)
(-1,+5) 1,200 -3.05% (-1,+5) 1,493 2.64%
421:779 (<.001) 924:569 (<.001)
(-1,+14) 1,200 -2.73% (-1,+14) 1,493 2.30%
461:739 (<.001) 850:643 (<.001)
Panel 2A. Dividend news after earnings news
DNEWS(-) DNEWS(+)
Event window Obs. CAR Event window Obs. CAR
(-1,0) 799 -0.41% (-1,0) 933 -0.03%
363:436 (0.035) 466:467 (0.408)
(-1,+1) 799 -0.51% (-1,+1) 933 -0.01%
375:424 (0.066) 454:479 (0.425)
(-1,+3) 799 -0.53% (-1,+3) 933 -0.18%
388:411 (0.048) 433:500 (0.135)
(-1,+5) 799 -0.25% (-1,+5) 933 -0.26%
413:386 (0.208) 442:491 (0.048)
(-1,+14) 799 -0.63% (-1,+14) 933 0.10%
400:399 (0.057) 447:486 (0.227)
78 The Marginal Information Content of Dividends and Earnings
Table 3.4.5 continued here
Panel 2B. Dividend news after earnings news in at least three days
DNEWS(-) DNEWS(+)
Event window Obs. CAR Event window Obs. CAR
(-1,0) 313 -0.45% (-1,0) 342 0.12%
144:169 (0.138) 164:178 (0.350)
(-1,+1) 313 -0.46% (-1,+1) 342 0.14%
148:165 (0.253) 164:178 (0.250)
(-1,+3) 313 -0.87% (-1,+3) 342 0.01%
150:1673 (0.046) 144:198 (0.117)
(-1,+5) 313 -0.27% (-1,+5) 342 -0.03%
164:149 (0.185) 163:179 (0.053)
(-1,+14) 313 -0.62% (-1,+14) 342 0.09%
162:151 (0.047) 152:190 (0.034)
sight cases when forecast errors equal zero. DFERRSIGN is a dummy vari-
able equal to 1 for positive and zero for negative dividend forecast errors.
EFERRSIGN is a dummy variable equal to 1 for positive and zero for negative
earnings forecasts. Since in Models 3 and 4 I examine the eect of the sign of
the forecast errors, I eliminate zero forecast error observations, which leaves
me 7,127 rm-quarters. I also control for rm size, rm age, investment op-
portunities, and leverage. Since rm size is highly positively correlated with
rm age, I use these variables interchangeably.11 Firm size has been used in
the literature as a control for the density of the informational environment
of the rm (Amihud and Li, 2006). This means that investors accumulate
11I check formally for multicollinearity in my regression models. I do not nd that my pre-
dictor variables are strongly correlated with each other. Thus, in Model 4 the variance ina-
tion factor ranges from 1.00 to 1.04 for the coecients on dividend forecast errors size, earnings
forecast errors size, dividend forecast error sign, earnings forecast errors sign, and rm age. The
variance ination factor for leverage and investment opportunities coecients is slightly higher
and equals 2.4, which might be because the derivation of both variables includes the total mar-
ket value of equity. Overall low values of the variance ination factor indicate that estimated
coecients are not increased by much due to the inclusion of any predictor in the model.
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Table 3.4.6: Cumulative Abnormal Returns Around Isolated Dividend An-
nouncements
This table provides cumulative abnormal returns around dividend announcements. To be in-
cluded in the sample, a dividend event must be isolated from an earnings event by at least
three days. Dividend news is identied using absolute dividend forecast errors. The rst row
of the Obs. columns shows the total number of events with negative (DNEWS(-)) and posi-
tive (DNEWS(+)) dividend announcements. The second row presents the number of positive
and negative CARs in the indicated event window to the left and to the right of the semicolon
correspondingly. The CAR columns show mean cumulative abnormal returns and p-values in
parentheses. The latter are the one-tailed p-values evaluating the null against the alternative
that the mean is less than zero for negative dividend announcements and greater than zero for
positive dividend announcements.
DNEWS(-) DNEWS(+)
Event win-
dow
Obs. CAR Event win-
dow
Obs. CAR
(-1,0) 212 -0.70% (-1,0) 238 0.04%
112:100 (0.059) 130:107 (0.446)
(-1,+1) 212 -0.63% (-1,+1) 238 -0.08%
115:97 (0.094) 131:106 (0.596)
(-1,+3) 212 -0.91% (-1,+3) 238 -0.28%
107:105 (0.058) 133:104 (0.773)
(-1,+5) 212 -0.30% (-1,+5) 238 -0.23%
99:113 (0.309) 127:110 (0.692)
(-1,+14) 212 -0.97% (-1,+14) 238 -0.77%
99:113 (0.192) 137:100 (0.848)
more information about the older rm than the younger one by the time of
an announcement. One therefore expects a weaker price reaction for a large,
old rm and a negative sign on the rm size, rm age coecients. Firm size is
the logarithm of the sum of the total liabilities and the total market value of
common shares outstanding at the quarter-end for single issue companies or
the sum of all issue-level market values, including trading and non-trading
issues, for multiple issue companies. Firm age is the number of years since
the rm’s rst appearance in CRSP. In accordance with the literature, I also
include investment opportunities and leverage as control variables (see, e.g.,
80 The Marginal Information Content of Dividends and Earnings
Andres et al. (2013)). The investment opportunities variable is approximated
with the ratio of total market value of equity to total assets. Leverage is ob-
tained as the ratio of total liabilities to the sum of the total liabilities and
the total market value of common shares outstanding at the quarter-end for
single issue companies or the sum of all issue-level market values, including
trading and non-trading issues, for multiple issue companies.
As evident from Table 3.4.7, no statistically signicant linear dependence
between mean CARs and dividend news to the market can be found. Mean-
while, earnings related variables enter all four model specications with sig-
nicant coecients. Models 1 and 2 predict that a dollar change in earnings
forecast errors is associated with a change in CARs of 0.001 and 0.002 per-
centage points respectively. At the same time, declaring higher earnings
than expected generates on average 0.04 percentage points higher returns
(Models 3 and 4). The regression results allow us to conclude that it is the
new information on earnings, rather than that on dividends, which causes
market participants to review their price targets.
3.5 Conclusion
In this paper, I reexamine the information content of dividends. I empirically
test whether dividends provide incremental information over and above that
conveyed by earnings. My approach diers from that of the relevant liter-
ature in that I employ I/B/E/S analysts’ forecasts as a more precise proxy
for market expectations than the conventionally used previous quarter div-
The Marginal Information Content of Dividends and Earnings 81
Table 3.4.7: Regression Coecients of Cumulative Abnormal Returns on the
Forecast Errors and Control Variables
This table provides the results of estimating OLS regressions, where the dependent variable is
CARs around contemporaneous announcements of dividends and earnings from the event win-
dow (-1,1). Explanatory variables are the size and the sign of earnings and dividend forecast
errors. DFERRSIZE and EFERRSIZE stand for the size of dividend and earnings absolute forecast
errors. Forecast errors are identied as the simple dierence between the actual value and its
mean analysts’ estimate. DFERRSIGN is a dummy variable equal to 1 for positive and zero for
negative dividend forecast errors. EFERRSIGN is a dummy variable equal to 1 for positive and
zero for negative earnings forecasts. A set of control variables is obtained from the Compustat
database. Firm size is dened as the log of the sum of the total liabilities and the total market
value of common shares outstanding at the quarter-end for single issue companies or the sum
of all issue-level market values, including trading and non-trading issues, for multiple issue
companies. Firm age is the number of years since the rm’s rst appearance in CRSP. Invest-
ment opportunities is dened as the ratio of market value of equity to the book value of assets.
Leverage is measured as the ratio of total liabilities to the sum of the total liabilities and the total
market value of common shares outstanding at the quarter-end for single issue companies or
the sum of all issue-level market values, including trading and non-trading issues, for multiple
issue companies. The associated p-values are reported in parentheses.
CARs(-1,1)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
DFERRSIZE -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0003
(0.298) (0.303) (0.311) (0.288)
EFERRSIZE 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
DFERRSIGN -0.001 -0.001
(0.535) (0.441)
EFERRSIGN 0.038 0.037
(0.000) (0.000)
Firm size 0.00001 -0.002
(0.974) (0.000)
Firm age -0.0001 -0.0001
(0.026) (0.002)
Inv.opportunities 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.000) (0.000) (0.054) (0.183)
Leverage -0.001 -0.002 0.003 -0.002
(0.592) (0.441) (0.513) (0.716)
Constant 0.003 0.002 -0.007 -0.02
(0.923) (0.285) (0.133) (0.000)
No. of obs 26,720 26,720 7,127 7,127
R-squared 0.003 0.004 0.08 0.08
F-statistic 18.46 19.46 92.57 90.92
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idends. By combining price-reaction and expectations data in an event study
and by means of a regression analysis, I examine whether unexpected changes
in dividend policy explain changes in rm valuation. The specication of my
event studies, in which I use analysts’ dividend projections, sheds light on
the discussion in the research literature on whether analysts prominently
base their stock valuation models on dividends.
This study nds that, in a panel of U.S. companies in the period from 2002 to
2012, stock market participants did not price dividend information. In this
paper, I show that the market neither appreciates nor depreciates the stock
value of rms that exceed analysts’ dividend expectations or fail to do so. I
show that earnings, on the contrary, had a signicant rm valuation eect.
The absence of signicant stock price eects from dividend surprises may
indicate that dividend discount models have not been the prevailing asset
valuation models among U.S. stock market professionals in the past decade.
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Chapter Four
Investor Awareness and Firm
Payout Policy
4.1 Introduction
High investor awareness has been described in the literature as an important
factor of the cost of capital and stock liquidity. In this paper I conrm and
apply the fact that high geographic dispersion of the rm is generically asso-
ciated with higher awareness among investors about this rm. At the same
time, dividends have been shown in the literature to increase investor atten-
tion. I therefore hypothesize that a high level of investor awareness proxied
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by high geographic dispersion negatively aects a rm’s payout. Empiri-
cally, I nd that a wider geographic dispersion of the rm predicts lower
levels of dividend payouts and repurchases. Consistent with the investor
awareness explanation of the proposed negative relation between rm geo-
graphic dispersion and payouts, I nd that retail rms exhibit lower dividend
payouts than non-retail rms. Furthermore, I show that an awareness eect
is also related to the size of the potential shareholder base and geographi-
cal area of rm operations. Additional evidence suggests that the eect is
attributable to smaller size rms, which are expected to prot most from an
increase in investor recognition.
This paper relates to a growing number of studies which recognize the im-
portance of a rm’s geography on stock market outcomes (Hong et al., 2008;
García and Norli, 2012; Bernile et al., 2015; Smajlbegovic, 2015). These stud-
ies identify states which are of economic relevance to the rm, using its
10-K lings. Although I ask a dierent research question, my paper is close
to this research in its methodology of dening geographic rm characteris-
tics. Secondly, a dierent strand of literature investigates corporate policies
implications of the rm’s geography. To the best of my knowledge, a sin-
gle paper which employs geographic measures in the dividends context is
that by John et al. (2011). However, it uses a dierent geographic variable,
which, unlike that of my paper, is used to proxy for a severeness of rm
agency problems. Researchers nd that rms with headquarters located in
a highly populated metropolitan statistical area exhibit lower agency costs
and, therefore, pay out lower dividends. Next, my paper relates to the Google
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search volume literature (Da et al., 2011; Bank et al., 2011; Fink and Johann,
2014). These studies use Google search inquiries to proxy for rm-specic
investor attention (general attention to a rm and demand for rm nancial
information) and analyze stock market eects such as turnover and volatil-
ity of stocks, abnormal returns, and market capitalization. In contrast, this
study investigates real eects, specically, the payout policy eects of in-
vestor attention.1
This paper contributes to existing literature by oering important new evi-
dence that investor awareness is an important factor in rm payout policy.
I rely on extensive literature suggesting investor recognition eects of divi-
dend payouts and repurchases. I quantify this eect. I formally test whether
a degree of being observable to investors relates to the location dispersion
of rm operations such as stores, construction sites, plants, logistic centers,
and R&D facilities. Therefore, I investigate whether a state of being more ob-
servable to investors explains relatively lower payouts in such rms. Thus,
my paper relates a rm’s geographic dispersion to investor awareness and
rm payout policy.
Merton (1987) was the rst to realize that incomplete investor information
about a population of stocks is responsible for an observed portfolio under-
diversication. Limited investor awareness lowers a rm’s market value and
increases its cost of capital. Moreover, individual investors have been shown
1Another study explores the relationship between demand for product information mea-
sured with Google search volume and actual monthly sales of motor vehicles and parts deal-
ers (Choi and Varian, 2012). However, while these results can pinpoint the ability of Internet
searches to predict sales reported with a time lag, they cannot suggest a causal link to a rm
operating performance.
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to prefer to hold stock of rms with easily recognizable products (Frieder
and Subrahmanyam, 2005). Therefore, rms have incentives to expand the
breadth of investor awareness.2
One way for an investor to become aware of a rm is by being in the ge-
ographic area of the rm.3 There are a number of reasons to hypothesize
that investor awareness of the rm increases with the rm’s geographic
dispersion, other things being equal. Local bias is a well-established phe-
nomenon which describes a tendency of both institutional and retail in-
vestors to allocate their capital into stocks of well-known and geographi-
cally proximate companies (see Coval and Moskowitz (1999, 2001); Baik et al.
(2010) for evidence on institutional investors’ local bias; see Grinblatt and
Keloharju (2002); Huberman (2001); Bodnaruk (2009); Ivkovic and Weisben-
ner (2005); Seasholes and Zhu (2010) for evidence on individual investors’
local bias). One possible explanation for local bias is familiarity. This phe-
nomenon is described in Huberman (2001) and Keloharju et al. (2012). Hu-
berman (2001) documents a tendency of investors to hold stock of providers
of local telephone services. Keloharju et al. (2012) investigate investment
behavior of car buyers from Finland and conclude that it is a patronage be-
havior of investors which makes them buy stocks of rms whose products
they have experienced. Evidence from the local bias and familiarity litera-
2Following Merton, I will use the term "investor awareness" alongside with the term "degree
of investor recognition" interchangeably, as well as "better-known" or "lesser-known" rms, and
"rm visibility".
3I do not need an assumption about the character of an investor’s familiarity with the rm.
Theoretically, investors may encounter the rm’s branch during their daily routines, whether
using services or products of the rm, being employed by the company, from local news, or by
word of mouth.
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ture thus suggests that geographic dispersion of the rm positively relates
to potential investor awareness.
Moreover, the existing literature suggests that rms may use dividends and
repurchases to increase retail investor attention to the rm. In a survey of
nancial executives, Brav et al. (2005) report that on a scale from -2 to +2
about 45% of respondents either agree (+1) or strongly agree (+2) that pay-
ing out dividends helps a rm attract retail investors, with the average rating
being signicantly dierent from zero. The authors also nd that, accord-
ing to the managers’ view, the relative importance of dividends is higher
for retail than it is for institutional investors. Although some respondents
(one fth) believe that repurchases also attract retail investors, on average
nancial executive managers are inclined to disagree with this statement.
Additional evidence suggests that rms may not only have the means to
attract retail investors, but also should be interested in the retail investor
ownership. Brav et al. (2005) document some managers’ confessions that re-
tail investors tend to hold a rm stock longer than institutional investors if
signs of troubles appear. Whereas Brav et al. (2005) oer managers’ views
in support of the notion that dividends are able to attract the attention of
investors, Drake et al. (2012) provide a direct empirical assessment of this
eect. The latter study measures abnormal Google search volume and nds
that it is signicantly positively associated with dividend announcements.
Combining the argument of a rm payout policy’s ability to attract potential
investors’ attention and the above discussion of a generic investor awareness
due to proximity to the rm’s locations, I expect widely dispersed rms to
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adopt lower payout strategies. I assume that a decision on a rm’s location
is not driven by the rm’s dividend policy. While it is very unlikely that a
rm expands its geographical area for reasons related to stimulating investor
recognition, it is quite probable that a rm’s management considers, inter
alia, the achieved level of investor recognition when setting its payout policy.
This conclusion is based on the lifecycle theory of a rm, which suggests that
it is usually mature rms that start paying out dividends. This suggests that
a rm’s decision to locate its operations precedes setting the payout policy
and is independent of the latter.
In this paper I make use of rm geographic data to develop a novel way of
measuring investor awareness. I do so by counting the number of state ci-
tations in the rm’s 10-K lings. 10-K lings, or annual reports, contain rel-
evant rm and market information including information on, inter alia, the
location of subsidiaries, rm facilities, construction sites, production plants,
and stores. Using information on economically relevant states’ locations, I
construct measures of investor awareness about the rm.
I conduct a number of tests to conrm that using information on a rm’s
geographic location is a reasonable method to proxy for investor awareness.
I hypothesize that if geographic dispersion is a good proxy of awareness
then it should be manifested in the Internet searches of a rm. Using Google
Trends, I extract data on Google search volume of a rm name across U.S.
states. Analysis of this data allows to see that rms are indeed searched for
on the Internet from those states which are classied as economically rele-
vant according to the 10-K lings. In 95% of rm-year observations, compa-
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nies have a higher Google search volume from the states where they are eco-
nomically present than from other states. This and other pieces of evidence
suggest that key explanatory variables which I construct using geographic
rm characteristics are informative about the degree of potential investors’
rm awareness.
This paper’s key nding is that a higher investor awareness proxied by a to-
tal number of states in the 10-K lings is associated with a lower level of rm
payout, all things being equal. A growth of about three states in the rm’s
economic presence is associated with a 0.06 percentage point decrease in
the dividend yield after controlling for the rm’s market capitalization, free
cash ows, investment opportunities, return on assets, option incentives,
industry and year xed eects. This result may rst seem economically in-
signicant. However, given the mean value of the sample dividend yield of
0.9%, this result corresponds to a substantial dividend yield decrease of 7%.
In a similar panel regression using repurchase yield as a dependent variable,
I obtain a coecient of -0.16 on a logarithm of one plus the total number of
states, or an 8% decrease in the repurchase yield.
Next, I develop other measures of investor awareness based on the data on
a rm’s geographic locations. Specically, I compute the total population in
the states where rms are economically present. I also weight this measure
by population wealth. I calculate the total area of states with a rm’s eco-
nomic presence and the measure of a rm’s geographic concentration. Key
results hold when implementing these geography based proxies of investor
attention. In other tests I control for the dividend clientèle explanations of
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dividends and proximity to investors.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 4.2 I describe
my data sampling procedure and present descriptive statistics. In Section
4.3 I provide evidence of the relationship between rm geographic charac-
teristics and a rm payout policy. The explanation of this eect related to
investor awareness of a rm, as well as robustness checks are contained in
Section 4.4. Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Data
4.2.1 Sampling Procedure
Data for the main analysis comes from various sources. I begin with collect-
ing rm operations data and data on control variables as described in detail
in the next two sections.
First, I collect balance sheet, income statement items, payout variables, as
well as some rm location information (state and county code) from Com-
pustat North America. Secondly, I obtain data on executive compensation
from the ExecuComp database. Information regarding executives’ salary,
bonus, or stock options only begins in 1993. So my analysis is limited to
the sample with data on an annual basis that runs from 1993 to 2010. I then
proceed by applying the following lters to the sample.
My sampling procedure parallels that of John et al. (2011). Specically, I
exclude rms incorporated or located outside the U.S.. To avoid confounding
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eects of certain regulatory environments, I exclude nancial (SIC codes
6000—6999) and utility rms (SIC codes 4900—4999). Finally, I exclude rms
with total asset values of less than $20 million. All variables are winsorized
at the 1st and 99th percentile levels to reduce the eect of possibly spurious
outliers.
Since I analyze rm payout decisions, I consider dividends, share repur-
chases, and total payouts as the main dependent variables. Total payouts
are equal to the sum of dividends and share repurchases. For all payout
variables I calculate per share measures and yields.
4.2.2 Geographic and Demographic Data
As shown in the literature, headquarters locations and, in particular, their
distance to potential investors, large banks or nancial centers, at least par-
tially determine information costs (e.g. Sulaeman (2014); Malloy (2005)) and
thereby aect corporate payout policy (e.g. John et al. (2011)). To account
for dierences in information costs due to dierent headquarters locations,
I apply various distance measures. First, I follow an approach by Loughran
and Schultz (2005) to identify centrally located rms. I use the ten largest
consolidated metropolitan statistical areas (CMSAs) based on population as
reported in the 2010 Census. I construct an indicator variable that is set to
one if the rm’s headquarters are located in one of the ten largest CMSAs
based on population size, and zero otherwise.4 According to John et al., 2011,
4The 10 largest CMSAs based on population are New York City, Los Angeles, Chicago,
Washington-Baltimore, San Francisco, Boston, Philadelphia, Dallas, Miami, and Houston, in-
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p.535, “rms located farther away from large cities with high concentration
of ownership [. . . ] pose higher monitoring costs”. Therefore, in addition
to the indicator variable, I also calculate the logged distance between the
rm headquarters and the closest metropolitan statistical area outside the
10 largest CMSAs. Since rms located within one of the ten largest CMSAs
exhibit a distance of zero, I use the log of one plus the distance in kilometers.
Also, population in the headquarters location can be responsible for the level
of dividends. Becker et al. (2011) argue that rms located in counties with
a high proportion of local senior investors are more likely to pay dividends.
Following their denition, I calculate the proportion of individuals aged 65
or older on a state level.
By restricting rms’ locations to the headquarters, one ignores the fact that
rms substantially dier in their regions of economic activity. Results pre-
viously obtained in the literature using the rm headquarters location can
therefore be viewed as a part of a broader eect, which is not only related to
the rm’s headquarters location but also extends to other rm locations. I
therefore construct dierent measures of economic activity on a state level.
In the spirit of García and Norli (2012), I use a 10-K based measure of eco-
nomic activity. The economic relevance of a state in a given year is obtained
by parsing through the company’s 10-K ling and counting the number of
citations of that state. To distinguish rms that operate locally from rms
that spread their economic activities over the whole U.S., I use the log of one
cluding their suburbs. In addition, I re-run all analyses based upon the 25 largest CMSAs. The
other 15 cities include Atlanta, Detroit, Seattle, Minneapolis, Cleveland, Denver, Portland, Or-
lando, St.Louis, Pittsburg, Charlotte, Sacramento, Kansas City, Salt Lake City, and Columbus,
including their suburbs. The results of these analyses (untabulated) are qualitatively similar.
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plus the number of states which have at least one count in the rm’s 10-K
ling in a given year. I compute direct distances using latitudes and lon-
gitudes of the midpoints of each state. The coordinates are obtained from
Google Maps.
Three renements of the geographic dispersion variable are made. First, an
analysis of a within-rm variation in the geographic dispersion allows us to
identify cases with sudden jumps in the number of reported states with rm
operations. A close-up analysis of these types of ling suggests that they
mainly come from changes in reporting standards. I drop these observa-
tions from the analysis.5 I also make a further renement of the geographic
dispersion variable. Namely, I substract one state from the total number
of states mentioned in the 10-K lings in case the headquarter state diers
from the state of incorporation. This adjustment of the explanatory variable
is motivated by the fact that some rms are incorporated in the states due
to preferable tax treatment, administrative or legal considerations. In these
cases rms often act through an agent and are themselves not physically lo-
cated in the state of incorporation. For this reason they are not economically
5I allow for both positive and negative changes in the number of state counts. This im-
plies that rms may, for example, introduce a reporting policy of mentioning store locations or
they may stop reporting store locations. The geographic dispersion variable will then be mis-
specied, respectively, before and after the introduction of a change in a reporting standard.
Another important concern applies to sudden positive changes, because these may be due to
acquisitions. Since an acquisition may trigger some other unobservable factors which aect the
outcome variables, this motivates an exclusion of these cases from analysis, in addition to the
aforementioned misspecication problem. Another potential misspecication problem relates
to the possibility of dierences in reporting standards across the rms. If these dierences ex-
ist, then the geographic dispersion variable would underestimate rm geographic dispersion
for rms that implement a policy of never reporting their store locations, in contrast to those
rms that have the opposite policy, namely of always reporting this information. Conditional
on the existence of such dierences, the misspecication could introduce a bias in my esti-
mation results. Unfortunately, I cannot identify whether and to which extent this potential
misspecication problem is present in my data, and treat these cases accordingly.
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present in the state in the way which motivates a usage of state counts in
this study. Next, a frequency distribution of geographic dispersion is right-
skewed as shown in Figure 4.2.1. To normalize the distribution, a logarithm
of one plus the total number of state counts is used in the analysis.
For additional tests I compute geographic concentration, population from
the states with operations, and geographical area variables. Following the
literature, I dene the geographic concentration measure as the sum of squared
citation shares.6 I also account for the overall population in the region of eco-
nomic activity, since it positively relates to the size of the potential investor
base. Since areas of the states dier in size, I account for this fact by com-
puting the total area of the states where a rm is present. To that end, I use
the state population and state area from the 2010 Census. Among the above
described geography based proxies of potential investor awareness, the lat-
ter may be considered as a noisy one, because it includes barely populated
or even uninhabited areas.
4.2.3 Other Firm Characteristics
Geographic measures could be correlated with a rm-specic variable that
aects the level of payouts in the same direction, as I expect of the geo-
graphic dispersion (e.g. rms with more operations locations could exhibit
more protable investment opportunities and have therefore lower dividend
6Variations of a concentration measure have been used in the literature. Bernile et al. (2015)
dene a citation concentration variable as the sum of squared citation shares divided by the
square of the sum of citation shares. I follow García and Norli (2012); Smajlbegovic (2015) in
adapting the Hirschman-Herndahl index to state citations.
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payouts). I therefore include a set of control variables standard in the pay-
out literature before drawing any statistical inference on the relationship
between dividends and a rm’s geographic dispersion. Apart from the ge-
ographic and demographic rm characteristics, I introduce in the baseline
regressions, inter alia, market-to-book ratio, rm size, protability, free cash
ows, and executive stock options.
An important determinant for the choice between dividends and repurchases,
as well as for the amounts disbursed to shareholders is the existence of a
managerial stock option program. Managerial stock options are typically
not "dividend protected". As a consequence their value is diluted when a
rm pays dividends. Managers in rms with stock option plans therefore
have incentives to cut on dividend payouts, and may prefer repurchases over
dividends (Jolls, 1998; Kahle, 2002). To account for this, I include the number
of unexecuted managerial stock options normalized by shares outstanding.
CEO stock options are expected to enter dividend regressions with a negative
sign (Lambert et al., 1989). Repurchases, on the contrary, have been shown to
be positively aected by unexcersized executive stock options (Kahle, 2002).
Existing literature suggests that dividends and repurchases can be used to
disburse free cash ow and may thereby reduce agency costs. Accounting
for the agency costs explanation, I also include free cash ows (Easterbrook,
1984; Jensen, 1986; Stulz, 1990).7
7In John et al. (2011) free cash ow is dened as the ratio of cash ow (operating income be-
fore depreciation, minus interest expense, minus income taxes net of the change in deferred tax
and investment tax credits) to assets, times 100, if market-to-book is below one; zero otherwise.
I adopt their free cash ow denition, except that I assume interest expense and income taxes
net of the change in deferred tax and investment tax and investment tax credits in calculations
to equal zero if these are missing. This may introduce a measurement error for the highly lev-
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Moreover, managers have been shown to be primarily concerned about div-
idend stream stability (Lintner, 1956). Mature, protable rms are normally
more likely to sustain a steady dividend payout. I therefore include a rm’s
market capitalization and its return on assets (ROA) into dividend regres-
sions and expect a positive coecient on these variables. Growth rms
exhibit signicantly lower dividend yields than non-growth rms (Roze,
1982; Smith and Watts, 1992; Gaver and Gaver, 1993). To account for vari-
ation in dividends due to variation in investment opportunity sets, I use a
market-to-book ratio.8 Detailed denitions of control variables can be found
in Appendix 4.A. Additional controls used in sensitivity tests are described
in the robustness section.
4.2.4 Descriptive Statistics
Table 4.2.1 presents summary statistics for payout policy variables, geo-
graphic data, and control variables. On average rms pay an annualized div-
idend of 26 cents per share and exhibit an average dividend yield of 0.84%.
Since not only the minimum but also the median dividend yield is zero, I
ered rms; on the benet side I am able to retain many potential observations. Also, I set the
free cash ow to missing if market-to-book is unavailable. In a dierent specication of free
cash ow, I assume not all missing interest expense observations to equal zero, but only those
for which leverage is less than the sample median leverage. Main results remain qualitatively
and quantitatively similar (untabulated).
8The rationale behind using the market-to-book ratio is that the dierence between the
market and book values represents the value of the rm’s investment options. However, the
investment opportunity set may be misspecied when using the market-to-book ratio. Another
important consideration is that dividend yields and market-to-book ratios are both dened us-
ing stock prices, which may result in spurious correlation. I follow the most recent studies on
dividends in selecting my measure of investment opportunities (John et al., 2011). In order to
partially account for diculties in empirical research related to the market-to-book ratios, I
also use dividends per share apart from dividend yields and dividend payout ratios in order to
study payout choices.
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conclude that in many cases no dividend is paid at all. To examine the use
of dividends more precisely, I dene a dividend payer indicator variable that
equals zero if a rm never pays a dividend and one if a rm pays dividends at
least once over the sample period. Of the 2,450 rms in the sample, 861 rms
(or 35%) paid dividends at least at some point in the sample time period. Div-
idends are on average less than half of the total payouts. This is in line with
the ndings of Grullon and Michaely (2002), that share repurchases have
gained in importance and exceeded aggregate dividend payments at least in
some years since 1999. Moreover, repurchases are more volatile than divi-
dends. This pattern is consistent with managers using share repurchase in a
more exible way than they use dividends (Jagannathan et al., 2000).
In 42% of all rm-year observations, the headquarters are located in one of
the ten largest CMSAs. The average rm in the sample is located 120 kilo-
meters from the nearest of the ten largest CMSAs. However, the median
distance of ve kilometers is notably smaller, indicating a right-skewed dis-
tribution. These statistics suggest that while many headquarters are located
in or close to the largest cities, a substantial number of rms’ headquar-
ters are located more than 100 kilometers away. In contrast to my sum-
mary statistics, 53% of sample rms from John et al. (2011) are located in
top-ten metropolitan statistical areas, based on Census 2000, with the me-
dian distance to the top-ten big city being zero kilometers. These statistics
indicate that the sample rms from John et al. (2011) are located more cen-
trally than the rms from my sample. These dierences, however, may be
explained with our samples composition. The Census 2000 top-ten cities in-
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clude Detroit. Since then the city has gone through a major economic and
demographic decline. The reduction in population explains why Detroit is
no longer among the top-ten biggest cities according to the Census 2010. In-
stead, the Miami area, which was not previously included, has appeared on
the Census 2010 list of the mostly populated areas. Moreover, the timespan
covered by my sample is three years longer.
By construction, the number of distinct states cited can take a value between
1 and 50. The value of one indicates that a company operates solely in the
state of incorporation.9 A value of 50 indicates that a rm operates in all
50 states. The average rm in my sample operates in 14 states. This is a
rst indication that the region of economic activity is much larger than just
the county or the state where the headquarters are located. The range is
wide, from 1 to 50 in all years; the overall standard deviation is 10.3. These
statistics suggest that sample rms substantially dier in their regions of
economic activities. The cross-sectional distribution of the sum of states
cited is also depicted in Figure 4.2.1.
9In the 10-K lings rms are obliged to name a state of incorporation and a full business
address, which includes a state. The state of incorporation can deviate from the state of the
headquarters location.
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Table 4.2.1: Summary Statistics of the Main Variables
This table provides summary statistics of the main dependent, explanatory, and control variables. The sample
includes Compustat rms with available geographic, demographic, and CEO compensation data, and excludes
nancial rms (SIC 6000—6999), regulated industries (SIC 4900—4999), rms with total assets below $20
million, and rms incorporated outside the USA or in the non-contiguous territories. The sample period is
1993—2010. Dividend yield is the ratio of dividends on common stock to the market value of common equity,
times 100. Repurchase yield is the ratio of repurchased common stock to the market value of common equity,
times 100. Total payout yield is the ratio of the sum of dividends on common stock and repurchased common
stock to the market value of common equity, times 100. Dividend payout ratio is the ratio of dividends on
common stock to the total payout on common equity, times 100. Dividend payer is an indicator variable equal
to one if a rm pays dividends at least once over the sample period and zero if a rm never pays a dividend.
Geographic dispersion is the number of states cited at least once in a rm’s SEC 10-K ling. Geographic
concentration is dened as the sum of squared state citation shares, where state citation share is the number
of state counts in a 10-K ling divided by the total number of counts of all states in the 10-K ling (SEC 10-K
lings). Central location in top 10 (25) consolidated metropolitan statistical area (CMSA) is a dummy set to
one if a rm’s headquarters (Compustat) are located in the top 10 (25) CMSA; zero otherwise. Distance to top
10 CMSA is the distance in kilometers or miles from the rm’s headquarters location to the middle point of
the closest CMSA if the rm’s headquarters are located outside the top 10 CMSA; zero otherwise. Distance
is the logarithm of one plus the distance in miles to the closest top-ten metropolitan area, based on the 2010
Census. Geographical area is the total area of the states which a rm mentions at least once in its 10-K ling
(Census 2010). Population is the total number of the population from the states (Census 2010) for which a
rm’s state count is non-zero (SEC 10-K lings). Older 65 is the ratio of the population older than 65 years
old to the total population from the headquarters state (Census 2000, Census 2010), times 100. Free cash ow
is the ratio of cash ow (operating income before depreciation, minus interest expense (if available), minus
income taxes net of the change in deferred tax and investment tax and investment tax credits (if available))
to total assets, times 100, if market-to-book is available and below one; equal to zero if market-to-book is
available and higher than one; and missing if market-to-book is unavailable. Firm size is the market value of
common equity, with the stock price being the average stock close price during a scal year. Market-to-book
is the ratio of rm market value (book value of total assets, plus market value of common equity, minus book
value of common equity) to total assets. ROA is the ratio of EBITDA to total assets. CEO options is the ratio
of the total number of unexcercised options vested and not yet vested held by the executive at the scal year
end to the number of shares outstanding (ExecuComp). All dependent and control variables are winsorized
at the 1% and 99% percentile.
Obs. Mean Median Min Max Std
Panel A. Dependent variables
Dividend yield [%] 20,674 0.9 0 0 7.1 1.4
Repurchase yield [%] 19,209 2.1 0.2 0 23.2 4.0
Total payout yield [%] 19,173 3.1 1.6 0 26.7 4.6
Dividend / total payout [%] 14,109 42.1 29.6 0 100.0 41.7
Dividend payer 2,450 0.35 0 0 1 0.48
Panel B. Explanatory variables
Geographic dispersion 20,725 14.2 11.0 1.0 50.0 10.3
Geographic concentration 20,725 0.28 0.25 0.028 1 0.16
Central location (top 10) 20,725 0.42 0 0 1 0.49
Central location (top 25) 20,725 0.62 1 0 1 0.49
Distance to top 10 [km] 19,183 120.430 4.646 0 1,061.347 196.745
Distance to top 10 [miles] 19,183 74.832 2.887 0 659.490 122.252
Distance 19,183 2.28 1.36 0 6.49 2.37
Geographical area [km2] 20,051 120,286 42,451 0 1,127,921 201,137
Population [mln] 20,944 130 116 0 308 71,1
Older 65 [%] 20,726 12.8 12.9 7.7 17.3 1.6
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Table 4.2.1 continued here
Panel C. Control variables
Free cash ow 15,949 0.580 0.000 -2.813 13.510 2.405
Firm size 20,715 5,242.538 1,050.925 41.209 103,418.900 14,312.660
CEO options 20,715 0.029 0.022 0.000 0.130 0.025
Market-to-book 15,951 2.158 1.655 0.718 10.077 1.556
ROA 20,674 0.140 0.140 -0.257 0.428 0.103
Figure 4.2.1: Histogram of the Number of Distinct State Counts
This graph shows the frequency distribution of geographic dispersion across all rm-year ob-
servations. The sample includes Compustat rms with available geographic, demographic, and
CEO compensation data, and excludes nancial rms (SIC 6000—6999), regulated industries (SIC
4900—4999), rms with total assets below $20 million, and rms incorporated outside the USA
or in the non-contiguous territories. The sample period is 1993—2010. Geographic dispersion
equals the total number of distinct states mentioned at least once in the rms’ U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission annual report (SEC 10-K lings).
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Table 4.2.2: Evolution of the Total Number of Distinct States Mentioned in
the 10-K Filings
This table provides key statistics on geographic dispersion. The sample includes Compustat
rms with available geographic, demographic, and CEO compensation data, and excludes -
nancial rms (SIC 6000—6999), regulated industries (SIC 4900—4999), rms with total assets
below $20 million, and rms incorporated outside the USA or in the non-contiguous territories.
The sample period is 1993—2010. Geographic dispersion equals the total number of distinct
states mentioned at least once in a rm’s SEC 10-K ling.
Year Obs. Mean Med. Min Max Std.
1993 463 15.6 14 1 50 9.5
1994 751 14.4 12 1 50 9.1
1995 904 13.7 11 1 50 9.2
1996 1,258 13.3 11 1 50 9.3
1997 1,314 13.4 10.5 1 50 9.5
1998 1,318 13.5 11 1 50 9.8
1999 1,248 13.6 11 1 50 10.0
2000 1,199 13.9 11 1 50 10.2
2001 1,217 14.3 11 1 50 10.4
2002 1,230 14.4 11 1 50 10.6
2003 1,252 14.5 11 1 50 10.6
2004 1,218 14.7 11 1 50 10.8
2005 1,137 15.1 11 1 50 11.0
2006 1,211 14.7 11 1 50 10.8
2007 1,300 14.3 11 1 50 10.7
2008 1,267 14.3 11 1 50 10.7
2009 1,242 14.3 11 1 50 10.8
2010 1,196 14.5 11 1 50 11.0
Total 20,725 14.2 11 1 50 10.3
Besides cross-sectional variation, I also observe some variation over time.
Table 4.2.2 shows the evolution of the number of states cited in the 10-K
lings. In line with the ndings of García and Norli (2012), the number of
states is slightly higher in the early years, decreases until 1997 and then
increases again. The high number in the early years can be explained by the
fact that prior to May 1996, ling via the EDGAR system was voluntary and
most likely only larger rms distributed their 10-K lings electronically.
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From Table 4.3.1 I learn that the most frequently mentioned states in the 10-K
lings are Delaware, California, Texas, New York, and Washington, while the
least frequently mentioned are North Dakota, South Dakota, Alaska, Mon-
tana, and Wyoming.
4.3 Main Findings
I begin my analysis with univariate comparisons of dierent payout poli-
cies conditional on rm geographic characteristics. I identify rms as being
high versus low in a particular geography attribute. Specically, I use such
geography attributes as geographic dispersion, geographic concentration,
and population from states of economic presence.10 I expect that the greater
the dispersion or population, and the lower the concentration of the rm’s
geographical area, the greater the awareness of that rm among potential
investors. Hence, these rms are less interested in paying high dividends or
repurchasing stock in order to increase investor attention.
A preliminary crude test is based on a sample split by the number of states
cited. As I am interested in the dierences between rms that are compactly
located and rms that have operations in a considerable number of states, I
compare rms in the lowest decile of geographic dispersion with rms in the
highest. In an unreported result, I ascertain that rms in the lowest decile
pay signicantly lower dividends per share and dividend yields than rms in
10From here on I will use the terms "geographic dispersion" or "number of states cited" inter-
changeably for the variable which is computed as the natural logarithm of one plus the number
of states cited in the rm 10-K ling. "Highly dispersed", "widely spatially organized" are terms
used to indicate rms with a high geographic dispersion variable.
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Table 4.3.1: States Citation Metrics from the 10-K Filings
The sample includes Compustat rms with available geographic, demographic, and CEO compensation data,
and excludes nancial rms (SIC 6000—6999), regulated industries (SIC 4900—4999), rms with total assets
below $20 million, and rms incorporated outside the USA or in the non-contiguous territories. The sample
period is 1993—2010. For a corresponding state (column one), this table provides statistics on state counts
(second column), state count shares (third column), and mean citation shares (fourth column). State count is
dened as the number of 10-K lings in which a state is mentioned at least once. State count share is obtained
by dividing the number of 10-K lings in which a state was mentioned at least once (second column) by the
total number of 10-K lings in my sample, times 100. The fourth column shows the sample mean citation
share of an individual state. State citation share is the number of state counts in the 10-K ling, divided by
the total number of counts of all states in the 10-K ling.
State State count State count share Mean state citation share
Alabama 5,217 22.20% 0.90%
Alaska 1,631 6.94% 0.36%
Arizona 5,854 24.91% 1.26%
Arkansas 3,761 16.01% 0.61%
California 15,906 67.69% 13.14%
Colorado 6,825 29.05% 1.55%
Connecticut 5,274 22.45% 1.38%
Delaware 18,671 79.46% 16.81%
Florida 8,977 38.20% 2.78%
Georgia 8,310 35.37% 2.50%
Hawaii 1,995 8.49% 0.22%
Idaho 2,240 9.53% 0.31%
Illinois 10,295 43.81% 3.27%
Indiana 6,236 26.54% 1.42%
Iowa 3,545 15.09% 0.67%
Kansas 5,311 22.60% 0.96%
Kentucky 4,800 20.43% 0.73%
Louisiana 5,327 22.67% 1.18%
Maine 2,108 8.97% 0.27%
Maryland 5,658 24.08% 1.08%
Massachusetts 8,579 36.51% 3.61%
Michigan 7,103 30.23% 1.88%
Minnesota 6,146 26.16% 2.26%
Mississippi 4,458 18.97% 0.77%
Missouri 5,763 24.53% 1.16%
Montana 1,908 8.12% 0.24%
Nebraska 2,705 11.51% 0.46%
Nevada 6,086 25.90% 1.43%
New Hampshire 2,380 10.13% 0.31%
New Jersey 7,904 33.64% 2.12%
New Mexico 3,187 13.56% 0.32%
New York 12,690 54.01% 7.90%
North Carolina 6,923 29.46% 1.61%
North Dakota 1,556 6.62% 0.14%
Ohio 8,479 36.09% 3.09%
Oklahoma 4,742 20.18% 0.86%
Oregon 4,427 18.84% 1.10%
Pennsylvania 9,073 38.61% 2.63%
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State State count State count share Mean state citation share
Rhode Island 2,131 9.07% 0.31%
South Carolina 4,279 18.21% 0.62%
South Dakota 1,597 6.80% 0.18%
Tennessee 6,318 26.89% 1.44%
Texas 13,021 55.42% 6.51%
Utah 4,161 17.71% 0.73%
Vermont 2,330 9.92% 0.20%
Virginia 7,855 33.43% 2.13%
Washington 10,059 42.81% 2.47%
West Virginia 2,709 11.53% 0.31%
Wisconsin 5,440 23.15% 1.55%
Wyoming 2,075 8.83% 0.28%
the highest decile. The observed dierence in dividends is strictly contrary
to my hypothesis. However, this result is mostly driven by the fact that rms
operating in several states are typically large in size and more mature. In line
with the literature, these should be the rms that initiate dividend payments
and exhibit higher total payouts (Gaver and Gaver, 1993; Smith and Watts,
1992). This nding does not necessarily contradict my main hypothesis, as
the awareness and the size eects are not mutually exclusive. One way to
disentangle the awareness and the size eects is to orthogonalize the log-
arithm of one plus geographic dispersion, and the logarithm of geographic
concentration and population by regressing them on size measured with the
logarithm of market capitalization.
The results of the sample split based on the orthogonalized variables are re-
ported in Table 4.3.2. After eliminating the size eect, I nd signicantly
lower payout levels of both dividends and repurchases among dispersed
rms, compared to those of local rms, as shown in Panel A. Also the com-
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position of payouts is signicantly dierent among the two groups. Specif-
ically, local rms distribute 30% of a total payout in the form of dividends,
whereas dispersed rms distribute only 9.3% (untabulated). Total payout
yield of dispersed rms is 1.57 percentage points lower than that of local
rms. More dispersed rms are more likely to have headquarters in one of
the largest CMSAs. This suggests that in my data rms with headquarters
in the largest CMSAs exhibit lower dividend payouts, a results which is also
found in John et al. (2011). As evident from column (4), the location eect
amounts to almost three quarters of the dividend yield and slightly more
than a half of the total payout.
In the analyses from Panels B and C in Table 4.3.2, I use other dimensions of
a rm’s geographic characteristics, namely, geographic concentration and
population from the states with operations. Panel B from Table 4.3.2 uses a
sample split by the Hirschman-Herndahl index, adapted for state citations.
Therefore, this variable should be understood as a concentration measure of
rm operations, and the eect is expected to run counter to the direction
predicted for geographic dispersion. An advantage of this measure of rm
location is that it is continuous. Moreover, it factors in a frequency with
which a certain state was mentioned in the 10-K ling. This way the measure
correctly classies a rm as local even if it mentions many states but a few
more frequently than the others. In Panel C I split the sample using the size
of the population from the states with operations variable.
Overall, the results in Panels B and C in Table 4.3.2, support the main infer-
ences. In line with predictions, I nd that highly concentrated rms (Panel
112 Investor Awareness and Firm Payout Policy
B) exhibit higher dividend and repurchase yields. Firms with a larger pop-
ulation living in the areas of their economic presence pay out lower divi-
dend and repurchase yields (Panel C). The t-test conrms the signicance
of the dierences in means for repurchase yields when using geographic
concentration proxy of awareness (compared to the less concentrated rms,
those with a high concentration spend 1.49 percentage points more on repur-
chases) and for dividend yields when using population (compared to rms
with more populated areas, those with less populated areas exhibit dividend
yields of 0.42 percentage points higher).
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Table 4.3.2: Firm Geographic Dispersion and Payout: Univariate Evidence
This table provides univariate comparisons of payout policy characteristics of geographically
concentrated and dispersed rms. The sample includes Compustat rms with available geo-
graphic, demographic, and CEO compensation data, and excludes nancial rms (SIC 6000—
6999), regulated industries (SIC 4900—4999), rms with total assets below $20 million, and
rms incorporated outside the USA or in the non-contiguous territories. The sample period is
1993—2010. In order to split the sample into geographically concentrated and dispersed rms, I
orthogonalize eects related to rm market capitalization and xed eects. First, I obtain resid-
uals from regressing the log of geographic dispersion, one minus geographic concentration,
and population on the log of market capitalization, industry and year eects. Next, I split the
sample using logged geographic dispersion, geographic concentration, and population (Panels
A, B, and C, respectively) into groups with low and high geographic dispersion, geographic
concentration, or population (columns 1 and 2, respectively), if a residual value belongs to the
bottom or to the top decile of these metrics, respectively. Next, two-sample t-tests of dier-
ences in means (column 3) are performed (column 4). The null (alternative) hypothesis is that
the dierence of means is (is not) zero. Signicance is denoted at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level with
***, **, *, respectively. Dividend yield is the ratio of dividends on common stock to the market
value of common equity, times 100. Repurchase yield is the ratio of repurchased common stock
to the market value of common equity, times 100. Total payout yield is the ratio of the sum of
dividends on common stock and repurchased common stock to the market value of common
equity, times 100. Variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentile.
Low High ∆ ∆/mean(all)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A. Geographic dispersion
Dividend yield, % 1.10 0.45 -0.65 -72% ***
Repurchase yield, % 3.43 2.18 -1.25 -60% ***
Total payout yield, % 3.54 1.97 -1.57 -51% ***
Panel B. Geographic concentration
Dividend yield, % 0.42 0.66 0.24 27%
Repurchase yield, % 2.32 3.67 1.35 64% ***
Total payout yield, % 2.17 3.66 1.49 48% ***
Panel C. Population
Dividend yield, % 0.81 0.39 -0.42 -47% ***
Repurchase yield, % 2.26 2.18 -0.08 -4%
Total payout yield, % 2.20 1.94 -0.26 -8%
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The descriptive statistics above give some indication of the validity of the
main hypothesis that dierences in the dispersion of the region of economic
activity aect corporate payout policy. Since univariate tests before orthog-
onalization show that other determinants could be correlated both with ge-
ographic characteristics and with payout policy, I formally test for the hy-
pothesized relationship in a multivariate analysis. Specically, I test if there
is a negative relationship between dierent payout policy variables and rm
geographic dispersion, controlling for a number of rm characteristics.
An important rm characteristic is size. It is very likely that the number of
states cited increases with rm size. I therefore include logged market cap-
italization in all regressions. Apart from that, I control for free cash ows,
CEO options, market-to-book, return on assets. The industry aliation can
also have an eect on both the region of economic activity and the payout
policy of a rm. Special events such as the introduction of a new regulation
or macroeconomic conditions may also aect the outcome variable. I there-
fore control for industry and year xed eects based on the 3-digit SIC code
in all regression models.
The main multivariate results are shown in Table 4.3.3. I nd that after
controlling for other rm characteristics, geographic coecients are statis-
tically signicantly negative and economically relevant. A coecient on
geographic dispersion in the rst model suggests that, in relation to a rm’s
economic presence, an increase corresponds to a 0.06 percentage points de-
crease in the rm dividend yield. This way the eect of geographic dis-
persion on dividends constitutes approximately 7% of the sample average
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dividend yield, and that eect on repurchases amounts to approximately 8%
of the sample average repurchase yield.
In line with expectations, dividend yields increase in free cash ow, rm size,
return on assets and decrease in executives’ stock options and investment
opportunities. Results on repurchase regressions are also generally consis-
tent with theory. Since executive stock options set incentives for managers
to pay out in the form of repurchases, the former enter repurchase regression
with a positive sign as expected. Repurchases are positively related to return
on assets and rm size and negatively to investment opportunities. A signif-
icantly negative coecient on the free cash ow variable in the repurchase
regressions suggests that rms, counter to their dividends policy, probably
do not uniformly employ repurchases as a mechanism to mitigate agency
costs. This result is consistent with the view that repurchases are used to
distribute transitory components in earnings and do not serve as a credible
signal of managerial commitment under these circumstances (Jagannathan
et al., 2000).
The results from the main regressions from Table 4.3.3 are consistent with
the conjecture that dispersed rms attract more investors than local rms
due to their wide spacial dispersion, and therefore they do not depend on
higher dividends to attract investors or on generating attention through
higher repurchases. In the next section I present robustness checks which
control for other competing explanations of dividends, and I elaborate on
the investor recognition explanation of the geography eect.
116 Investor Awareness and Firm Payout Policy
Table 4.3.3: Firm Geographic Dispersion and Payout Policy
The sample includes Compustat rms with available geographic, demographic, and CEO com-
pensation data, and excludes nancial rms (SIC 6000—6999), regulated industries (SIC 4900—
4999), rms with total assets below $20 million, and rms incorporated outside the USA or in
the non-contiguous territories. The sample period is 1993—2010. Dividend yield is the ratio of
dividends on common stock to the market value of common equity, times 100. Dividend per
share is the dollar amount of dividends paid on an ordinary share. Repurchase yield is the ratio
of repurchased common stock to the market value of common equity, times 100. Repurchase
per share is the dollar amount paid in the repurchase of an ordinary share. Total payout yield
is the ratio of the sum of dividends on common stock and repurchased common stock to the
market value of common equity, times 100. Total payout per share is the dollar amount paid in
dividends and/or in the repurchase of an ordinary share. Geographic dispersion here is the log
of one plus a number of distinct states counts (SEC 10-K lings). Besides, regressions include
standard rm-specic controls. Free cash ow is the ratio of cash ow (operating income before
depreciation, minus interest expense (if available), minus income taxes net of the change in de-
ferred tax and investment tax and investment tax credits (if available)) to total assets, times 100,
if market-to-book is available and below one; equal to zero if market-to-book is available and
higher than one; and missing if market-to-book is unavailable. Firm size is the market value of
common equity, with the stock price being the average stock close price during a scal year.
CEO options is the ratio of the total number of unexcercised options vested and not yet vested
held by the executive at the scal year end to the number of shares outstanding (ExecuComp).
Market-to-book is the ratio of rm market value (book value of total assets, plus market value
of common equity, minus book value of common equity) to total assets. ROA is the ratio of
EBITDA to total assets. All variables, excluding geographic dispersion, are winsorized at the
1% and 99% percentile. Ordinary least squares regressions of dividends are reported. Three-
digit SIC industry and year dummies are included. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Signicance at 1%, 5%, and 10% is denoted with ***, **, and *, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Div yield DPS Rep yield RPS Total yield TPPS
Geo dispersion -0.0611*** -0.0317*** -0.161** -0.0105 -0.210** -0.0522**
(0.0214) (0.00619) (0.0727) (0.0206) (0.0817) (0.0239)
Free cash ow 0.0301*** 0.000224 0.0240 -0.00824** 0.0591*** -0.00888**
(0.00613) (0.00113) (0.0197) (0.00342) (0.0227) (0.00399)
Firm size 0.116*** 0.0929*** 0.334*** 0.220*** 0.400*** 0.320***
(0.00953) (0.00309) (0.0284) (0.00878) (0.0337) (0.0103)
CEO options -5.170*** -1.020*** 17.15*** 5.125*** 11.18*** 4.225***
(0.434) (0.120) (1.914) (0.517) (2.169) (0.588)
Market-to-book -0.104*** -0.0316*** -0.495*** -0.0975*** -0.606*** -0.132***
(0.00625) (0.00215) (0.0240) (0.00786) (0.0269) (0.00903)
ROA 0.429*** 0.143*** 5.876*** 2.118*** 6.380*** 2.310***
(0.106) (0.0319) (0.424) (0.120) (0.495) (0.141)
Constant 0.728*** -0.224*** -0.385 -1.234*** 0.714 -1.464***
(0.282) (0.0502) (0.820) (0.247) (0.930) (0.261)
Observations 15,894 15,894 14,767 14,767 14,738 14,738
R-squared 0.313 0.414 0.131 0.191 0.155 0.256
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
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4.4 Robustness Checks
4.4.1 Investor Awareness Explanation
To explain the geography eect shown in the previous section, I rst sup-
pose that investor awareness about the existence of the rm should be more
pronounced in states that belong to a rm’s region of economic activity. I
test this conjecture using the search frequency in Google as an established
proxy of investor awareness.
An advantage of the Google Search Volume Index (SVI) over other proxies
for investor awareness is the fact that an Internet user will only actively
search a rm with Google if he or she is aware of and interested in the re-
spective rm. Da et al. (2011) and Drake et al. (2012) use ticker symbols of
rm names. Instead, I follow Bank et al. (2011) and identify a rm in Google
using its rm name, because it is more likely that a potential investor rst
becomes aware of a rm’s full name rather than its abbreviation used on the
stock market. As Google Trends only reports the SVI for a search item but
does not allow ltering of the purpose of the search, the authors thereby
try to distinguish a search demand for nancial information from a search
demand for other rm-specic information. However, I believe that the rm
name is more appropriate for the research question in this study, since I am
interested in the very fact that an investor is aware of a rm’s existence.
This general investor awareness is also manifested, for example, in product
related searches, promotions of the rm, and its opening hours. In addition,
institutional investors are likely to search for rm information using propri-
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etary nancial databases, e.g., Bloomberg, and Thomson Reuters, whereas
retail investors do not usually have access to these databases, and, hence,
they may be more inclined to use the Internet when searching for rm in-
formation. Hence, using Internet Google searches and rm names allows me
to capture awareness about the rm among retail investors.
I download the Google SVI for each rm on a state level. GSV reects the
intensity of search queries for the time period from 2004 to 2015. In order to
obtain the SVI, Google normalizes the number of rm search queries by the
total number of all searches in a state to avoid potential dierences in the
search volume that exist due to dierences in the state population. The re-
sulting numbers are then scaled to a range of 0 (state with no search demand)
to 100 (state with a high search demand).
First, I test if the Google SVI for a state increases with the relative citation
frequency in the 10-K lings. Mean state citation frequency in the rm’s
10-K lings is obtained as an individual state mean citation frequency over
the whole time series for the rm. A rm’s Google search volume indicates
the intensity with which the rm was searched on the Internet from within
the state. For the second test I compute tetrachoric correlations between a
state citation and a rm’s Google search volume binary variables. I dene a
rm-state citation indicator variable as equal to one if a rm cites this state
at least once in one of its 10-K lings; zero otherwise. I also set a rm-state
specic Google search volume indicator variable to one if the Google SVI
is greater than zero; zero otherwise. In this test I exploit people’s memory
eect. The memory eect represents the ability of people to memorize and
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recall a rm even after the rm discontinues its operations in the area.11
Construction companies provide a realistic example to illustrate this possi-
bility. As long as a construction company is active on a construction site,
it uses signage to provide outdoor advertising. Even after the construction
is over and the rm leaves the site, locals may still remember the name of
the company and search for information about the rm. I expect that tetra-
choric correlations which allow for memory eects should be even higher
than Pearson correlations.
The results from Table 4.4.1 are supportive of my expectation that with
the geographic dispersion variable I am able to capture investor awareness.
Table 4.4.1 (second column) shows the pairwise correlations between the
Google SVI and the relative citation frequency of each state. The average cor-
relation across all states is 22% and statistically dierent from zero. The tetra-
choric correlations are reported in the third column of Table 4.4.1. Overall,
I document an even stronger positive tetrachoric correlation between both
11Admittedly, some people may die or change their place of residence to a dierent state. As
extreme case, suppose that all people who carry knowledge about the rm, which no longer
operates in the state, die; hence, there should be no Internet searches of this rm from the state.
Then, my Google search volume indicator variable will be biased upwards. Next, as an extreme
case, suppose that all people from state A who carry knowledge of the rm leave the state for
another state (B), in which the rm is not economically present. As a result, the Google search
volume indicator variable will be biased upwards for state A and downwards for state B. Several
observations help assure that these issues do not seriously — if at all — diminish the power of
the test in the normal case, when some potential investors die or some potential investors leave
for a dierent state. First, the average life span of a rm in my sample is 9,6 years, which is
less than the length of time a person is usually active on the stock market. The latter may be
estimated as the life expectancy at birth minus the age at which the average American starts
investing on the stock market. The former was equal to 76.7 years in the year 2000 according
to the OECD database; a conservative estimate of the latter could be 35 years old. Secondly, the
percentage of movers is not economically signicant. For example, according to the survey on
the geographical mobility from the U.S. Census Bureau, in the period 1999—2000 only 3.1% of
the total population moved to a dierent state. Thirdly, if people move and continue searching
for a rm online from state B, these searches will be insuciently intensive to enter the Google
SVI, since the latter is being weighted by the total amount of other searches from state B.
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indicator variables with an average value of 26%. Only the state of Delaware
exhibits a negative correlation. At a rst glance this result for Delaware
may seem to be at odds with the main hypothesis but in fact the opposite
is the case. 66.31% of the sample rms are incorporated in Delaware and
are thereby required to cite this state in their 10-K lings. Nevertheless, this
does not mean that the rms’ headquarters or their production sites, sales
points, or other economically relevant facilities are located in Delaware. The
negative correlation conrms a conjecture that many rms are merely de
jure located in Delaware and have no operations in this state. This justies
the exclusion of Delaware from the total number of states cited, in cases of
a rm’s citation of Delaware as a state of incorporation only and not as a
state of its business address (results using this correction of the geographic
dispersion variable remain qualitatively the same).
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Table 4.4.1: Source of the Geography Eect: Google Search Volume and Firm
Geography
The sample includes a cross-section of Compustat rms with available geographic, demo-
graphic, CEO compensation data, and Google Search Volume Index for the time period 2004—
2015, and excludes nancial rms (SIC 6000—6999), regulated industries (SIC 4900—4999), rms
with total assets below $20 million, and rms incorporated outside the USA or in the non-
contiguous territories. Simple Pearson correlation coecients and tetrachoric correlation coef-
cients are shown in the second and third columns of this table, respectively. Simple Pearson
correlation coecients are computed between the mean state citation frequency in the rm’s
10-K lings and the rm’s Google Search Volume from this state. Mean state citation frequency
in the rm’s 10-K lings is obtained as the individual state mean citation frequency over the
whole time series for the rm. Firm Google search volume indicates the frequency with which
the rm was searched on the Internet from within the state. Tetrachoric correlation coecients
are computed between a state citation in the rm’s 10-K lings (binary) and the rm’s Google
Search Volume from this state (binary). A state citation binary variable equals one if the state
was ever mentioned in the rm 10-K lings; zero if not. A rm’s Google Search Volume (binary)
from the state is set to one here if the rm was ever searched in Internet from within the state;
zero if not.
State ρPears ρtetra
Alabama 0.24 0.29
Alaska 0.06 0.26
Arizona 0.22 0.28
Arkansas 0.14 0.24
California 0.62 0.20
Colorado 0.25 0.22
Connecticut 0.21 0.24
Delaware 0.07 -0.05
Florida 0.33 0.31
Georgia 0.33 0.30
Hawaii 0.18 0.32
Idaho 0.16 0.29
Illinois 0.35 0.28
Indiana 0.22 0.28
Iowa 0.22 0.26
Kansas 0.20 0.29
Kentucky 0.16 0.25
Louisiana 0.13 0.27
Maine 0.16 0.28
Maryland 0.25 0.23
Massachusetts 0.44 0.27
Michigan 0.28 0.30
Minnesota 0.35 0.25
Mississippi 0.13 0.21
Missouri 0.23 0.34
Montana -0.01 0.25
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Table 4.4.1 continued here
State ρPears ρtetra
Nebraska 0.26 0.39
Nevada 0.21 0.27
New Hampshire 0.13 0.24
New Jersey 0.21 0.17
New Mexico 0.10 0.24
New York 0.38 0.21
North Carolina 0.23 0.27
North Dakota 0.02 0.34
Ohio 0.34 0.19
Oklahoma 0.21 0.30
Oregon 0.30 0.26
Pennsylvania 0.36 0.21
Rhode Island 0.10 0.29
South Carolina 0.19 0.33
South Dakota 0.15 0.34
Tennessee 0.23 0.31
Texas 0.44 0.17
Utah 0.18 0.27
Vermont 0.07 0.24
Virginia 0.21 0.25
Washington 0.30 0.14
West Virginia 0.16 0.30
Wisconsin 0.30 0.31
Wyoming 0.10 0.25
All states 0.22 0.26
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In an additional robustness check (untabulated), I sort observations into two
mutually exclusive groups and compare the number of observations in each.
Specically, for each rm-year observation I compute a search volume from
states with rm operations and separately a search volume that a rm ob-
tains from the states in which it is not economically present. Then I compare
these two volumes. I nd that in 1,487 (96% of cases) rm-year observations,
the search volumes from states of economic presence are higher than those
from the other states, and only for 67 observations does the opposite hold.
Overall, results from this subsection conrm that investors living in a rm’s
region of economic activity are indeed more likely to be aware of the rm.
Also, geographic dispersion is an appropriate proxy of investor awareness.
An advantage of geographic dispersion over Google SVI as an awareness
measure for my analysis is that it allows for within-rm analysis.
The above tests are designed to assess the economic validity of the 10-K
based measures as a proxy of investor awareness. In the following analysis
I use this evidence combined with the fact that retail rms are more visible
to investors than non-retail rms, all things being equal. The former have
a better reach of households, enforcing potential investors’ familiarity with
their products and the rm itself (e.g. Keloharju et al. (2012)). This means
that more people are aware of a retail rm than of a non-retail rm, even
if these two are otherwise equal, including in their geographic dispersion.
My main hypothesis suggests that visibility of a rm negatively relates to
its payout levels.12 Hence, it implies that the eect of investor awareness on
12A high investor awareness case in the context of this paper corresponds to a high rm
visibility.
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dividends should be more pronounced in the retail rms subsample than in
the non-retail rms subsample.
The regression results are shown in Table 4.4.2. I identify rms producing
retail goods in the rst two digits of the SIC code, as they identify the major
industry. Firms with a 2-digit SIC code between 52 and 59 are classied as
retail trade.13 Consistent with economic intuition, the negative relation of
geographic spread and dividend yield is more pronounced and highly signif-
icant (1% level) among the retail trade rms (rst column) compared to non-
retail rms (second column). Therefore, the more widespread rms that are
also more visible to potential investors due to their end customer orienta-
tion (retail rms) exhibit a higher awareness eect on dividends, as expected
under the awareness explanation of dividend payouts.
4.4.2 Robustness Check: Other Geography Based Mea-
sures of Investor Awareness
In the next set of tests I use other rm geography related measures of in-
vestor awareness: one minus geographic concentration, population from
the states with operations, and geographical area. The advantage of the geo-
graphic concentration measure over that of geographic dispersion is that the
former is continuous. Also, it factors in the relative economic importance of
13According to the SIC codes specications, the range of SIC codes 5200—5999 belongs to the
broader industry classication "Retail Trade". The other classiable divisions include "Agricul-
ture, Forestry and Fishing", "Mining", "Construction", "Manufacturing", "Transportation, Com-
munications, Electric, Gas and Sanitary service" (excluded from the sample), "Wholesale Trade",
"Finance, Insurance and Real Estate" (excluded from the sample), "Services", "Public Adminis-
tration".
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Table 4.4.2: Source of the Geography Eect: Retail/Non-Retail Split
The sample includes a cross-section of Compustat rms with available geographic, demo-
graphic, CEO compensation data, and Google Search Volume Index for the time period 2004—
2015, and excludes nancial rms (SIC 6000—6999), regulated industries (SIC 4900—4999), rms
with total assets below $20 million, rms incorporated outside the USA or in the non-contiguous
territories. Dividend yield is the ratio of dividends on common stock to the market value of com-
mon equity, times 100. Geographic dispersion here is the log of one plus a number of distinct
states counts (SEC 10-K lings). Besides, regressions include standard rm-specic controls.
Free cash ow is the ratio of cash ow (operating income before depreciation, minus interest
expense (if available), minus income taxes net of the change in deferred tax and investment tax
and investment tax credits (if available)) to total assets, times 100, if market-to-book is available
and below one; equal to zero if market-to-book is available and higher than one; and missing if
market-to-book is unavailable. Firm size is the market value of common equity, with the stock
price being the average stock close price during a scal year. CEO options is the ratio of the
total number of unexcercised options vested and not yet vested held by the executive at the s-
cal year end to the number of shares outstanding (ExecuComp). Market-to-book is the ratio of
rm market value (book value of total assets, plus market value of common equity, minus book
value of common equity) to total assets. ROA is the ratio of EBITDA to total assets. All vari-
ables, excluding geographic dispersion, are winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentile. Ordinary
least squares regressions of dividend yield in the sample of retail (rst column) and non-retail
rms (second column) are reported. Firms with SIC codes 52—59 are classied as retail; rms
with SIC codes outside of this range are classied as non-retail. Three-digit SIC industry and
year dummies are included. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Signicance at 1%, 5%,
and 10% is denoted with ***, **, and *, respectively.
(1) (2)
Dep. variable: Div. yield Retail Non-retail
Geo dispersion -0.205*** -0.0425**
(0.0402) (0.0207)
Free cash ow 0.0304* 0.0267***
(0.0176) (0.00686)
Firm size 0.170*** 0.149***
(0.0237) (0.00949)
CEO options -2.446*** -2.388***
(0.841) (0.644)
Market-to-book -0.212*** -0.0997***
(0.0200) (0.00722)
ROA 0.492 0.259***
(0.314) (0.0753)
Constant 0.416 0.292
(0.255) (0.209)
Observations 1,528 13,358
R-squared 0.185 0.371
Industry FE YES YES
Year FE YES YES
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states proxied by the state fraction in the total number of states counts ob-
tained from the annual reports. The 1-geographic concentration variable is
positively correlated with geographic dispersion; hence, it is also expected
to obtain the positive sign in payout regressions.
As I show in the previous section, investor awareness represents a channel
through which the geography of a rm aects the rm’s payout level. If this
line of argument is correct, dividend payouts should decrease either with
the number of states in which the rm is present, or with the population
living within the rm’s region of economic activity, or with the area of the
rm economic presence. I therefore rene the economic activity measure
and sum the population of all states cited, as well as the area of the states of
the rm’s economic presence. Since geographic concentration, population,
and cumulated areas are correlated, I include them in separate regressions.
In Table 4.4.3—Table 4.4.5 I examine the relationship between these prox-
ies of investor attention, derived using rm geographic spread and rm
payout policy. The predictive power of all three awareness measures re-
mains in both the dividend yield and the dividend per share models (mod-
els (1)—(3) and (4)—(6) from Table 4.4.3, respectively). Results on the eect
of investor awareness on repurchases are less conclusive. Only model (1)
from Table 4.4.4 suggests a signicant negative relationship between the
1-geographic concentration variable and repurchase yield. Coecients on
awareness proxies from regressions (2) through (6) are not signicant. These
results suggest that the link between a rm’s geography and its repurchases
is less pronounced than that of a rm’s geography and its dividends. There-
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fore, the achieved level of investor awareness can aect a rm’s dividend
payout but not the size of its repurchase programs. This evidence is in line
with the marginal importance of dividends and repurchases in the ability to
attract investors outlined in the motivation to this paper. Since repurchases
have been shown earlier to constitute the largest fraction in the total pay-
outs (the mean and the median values are 57.9% and 70.4%, respectively),
results from the regressions of total payout yield and total payout per share
should be almost the same as those of repurchases. Indeed, as evident from
Table 4.4.5, only coecients on 1-geographic concentration in models (1) and
(4) are statistically signicant.
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Table 4.4.3: Robustness Checks: Alternative Measures of Investor Awareness
(1)
The sample includes Compustat rms with available geographic, demographic, and CEO compensation data,
and excludes nancial rms (SIC 6000—6999), regulated industries (SIC 4900—4999), rms with total assets
below $20 million, and rms incorporated outside the USA or in the non-contiguous territories. The sam-
ple period is 1993—2010. Dividend yield is the ratio of dividends on common stock to the market value of
common equity, times 100. Dividend per share is the dollar amount of dividends paid on an ordinary share.
Geographic concentration is dened as the sum of squared state citation shares, where state citation share is
the number of state counts in the 10-K ling divided by the total number of counts of all states in the 10-K
ling (SEC 10-K lings). Population here is the logarithm of the total population in the states where a rm’s
geographic dispersion is non-zero (Census 2000, Census 2010). Geographical area is the total area of the states
which a rm mentions at least once in its 10-K ling (Census 2010). Besides, regressions include standard
rm-specic controls. Free cash ow is the ratio of cash ow (operating income before depreciation, minus
interest expense (if available), minus income taxes net of the change in deferred tax and investment tax and
investment tax credits (if available)) to total assets, times 100, if market-to-book is available and below one;
equal to zero if market-to-book is available and higher than one; and missing if market-to-book is unavail-
able. Firm size is the market value of common equity, with the stock price being the average stock close
price during a scal year. CEO options is the ratio of the total number of unexcercised options vested and
not yet vested held by the executive at the scal year end to the number of shares outstanding (ExecuComp).
Market-to-book is the ratio of rm market value (book value of total assets, plus market value of common
equity, minus book value of common equity) to total assets. ROA is the ratio of EBITDA to total assets. All
explained and control variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentile. Ordinary least squares regres-
sions of dividend yield ((1)—(3)) and dividend per share ((4)—(6)) are reported. Three-digit SIC industry and
year dummies are included. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Signicance at 1%, 5%, and 10% is
denoted with ***, **, and *, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Div yield Div yield Div yield DPS DPS DPS
1-Geo concentration -0.197*** -0.0937***
(0.0698) (0.0205)
Population -0.0664*** -0.0280***
(0.0189) (0.00549)
Geographical area -2.35e-07*** -9.82e-08***
(7.45e-08) (1.99e-08)
Free cash ow 0.0300*** 0.0301*** 0.0321*** 0.000114 0.000154 0.000725
(0.00613) (0.00613) (0.00675) (0.00113) (0.00113) (0.00129)
Firm size 0.112*** 0.117*** 0.131*** 0.0908*** 0.0926*** 0.1000***
(0.00922) (0.00943) (0.0102) (0.00302) (0.00306) (0.00339)
CEO options -5.186*** -5.150*** -5.332*** -1.027*** -1.010*** -1.072***
(0.434) (0.433) (0.501) (0.121) (0.120) (0.139)
Market-to-book -0.103*** -0.104*** -0.119*** -0.0308*** -0.0312*** -0.0354***
(0.00611) (0.00612) (0.00686) (0.00214) (0.00212) (0.00252)
ROA 0.442*** 0.417*** 0.269** 0.149*** 0.139*** 0.103***
(0.106) (0.106) (0.125) (0.0319) (0.0319) (0.0382)
Constant 0.742*** 1.806*** 0.656* -0.222*** 0.219** -0.394***
(0.283) (0.437) (0.387) (0.0503) (0.109) (0.0526)
Observations 15,894 15,894 12,748 15,894 15,894 12,748
R-squared 0.313 0.314 0.333 0.413 0.414 0.440
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
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Table 4.4.4: Robustness Checks: Alternative Measures of Investor Awareness
(2)
This table provides summary statistics of the main dependent, explanatory, and control variables. The sample
includes Compustat rms with available geographic, demographic, and CEO compensation data, and excludes
nancial rms (SIC 6000—6999), regulated industries (SIC 4900—4999), rms with total assets below $20
million, and rms incorporated outside the USA or in the non-contiguous territories. The sample period
is 1993—2010. Repurchase yield is the ratio of repurchased common stock to the market value of common
equity, times 100. Repurchase per share is the dollar amount paid in the repurchase of an ordinary share.
Geographic concentration is dened as the sum of squared state citation shares, where state citation share
is the number of state counts in the 10-K ling divided by the total number of counts of all states in the
10-K ling (SEC 10-K lings). Population here is the logarithm of the total population in the states where a
rm’s geographic dispersion is non-zero (Census 2000, Census 2010). Geographical area is the total area of
the states which a rm mentions at least once in its 10-K ling (Census 2010). Besides, regressions include
standard rm-specic controls. Free cash ow is the ratio of cash ow (operating income before depreciation,
minus interest expense (if available), minus income taxes net of the change in deferred tax and investment
tax and investment tax credits (if available)) to total assets, times 100, if market-to-book is available and
below one; equal to zero if market-to-book is available and higher than one; and missing if market-to-book
is unavailable. Firm size is the market value of common equity, with the stock price being the average
stock close price during a scal year. CEO options is the ratio of the total number of unexcercised options
vested and not yet vested held by the executive at the scal year end to the number of shares outstanding
(ExecuComp). Market-to-book is the ratio of rm market value (book value of total assets, plus market value
of common equity, minus book value of common equity) to total assets. ROA is the ratio of EBITDA to
total assets. All explained and control variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentile. Ordinary least
squares regressions of repurchase yield ((1)—(3)) and repurchase per share ((4)—(6)) are reported. Three-digit
SIC industry and year dummies are included. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Signicance at 1%,
5%, and 10% is denoted with ***, **, and *, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Rep yield Rep yield Rep yield RPS RPS RPS
1-Geo concentration -0.723*** -0.0280
(0.239) (0.0659)
Population -0.0384 0.0148
(0.0625) (0.0175)
Geographical area 4.09e-07 7.69e-08
(2.96e-07) (8.64e-08)
Free cash ow 0.0240 0.0227 0.00992 -0.00829** -0.00848** -0.00897**
(0.0197) (0.0197) (0.0215) (0.00342) (0.00342) (0.00390)
Firm size 0.328*** 0.319*** 0.279*** 0.220*** 0.217*** 0.209***
(0.0273) (0.0280) (0.0307) (0.00852) (0.00872) (0.00952)
CEO options 17.11*** 17.20*** 17.20*** 5.124*** 5.126*** 5.256***
(1.915) (1.917) (2.231) (0.518) (0.518) (0.604)
Market-to-book -0.495*** -0.485*** -0.474*** -0.0972*** -0.0956*** -0.0904***
(0.0236) (0.0237) (0.0279) (0.00779) (0.00781) (0.00922)
ROA 5.908*** 5.895*** 6.003*** 2.120*** 2.125*** 2.178***
(0.425) (0.425) (0.500) (0.119) (0.120) (0.140)
Constant -0.212 -0.0113 0.0603 -1.236*** -1.522*** -0.973***
(0.827) (1.419) (1.166) (0.251) (0.409) (0.344)
Observations 14,767 14,767 11,919 14,767 14,767 11,919
R-squared 0.131 0.130 0.141 0.191 0.191 0.211
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
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Table 4.4.5: Robustness Checks: Alternative Measures of Investor Awareness
(3)
The sample includes Compustat rms with available geographic, demographic, and CEO compensation data,
and excludes nancial rms (SIC 6000—6999), regulated industries (SIC 4900—4999), rms with total assets
below $20 million, and rms incorporated outside the USA or in the non-contiguous territories. The sample
period is 1993—2010. Total payout yield is the ratio of the sum of dividends on common stock and repurchased
common stock to the market value of common equity, times 100. Geographic concentration is dened as the
sum of squared state citation shares, where state citation share is the number of state counts in the 10-K ling
divided by the total number of counts of all states in the 10-K ling (SEC 10-K lings). Population here is
the logarithm of the total population in the states where a rm’s geographic dispersion is non-zero (Census
2000, Census 2010). Geographical area is the total area of the states which a rm mentions at least once in its
10-K ling (Census 2010). Besides, regressions include standard rm-specic controls. Free cash ow is the
ratio of cash ow (operating income before depreciation, minus interest expense (if available), minus income
taxes net of the change in deferred tax and investment tax and investment tax credits (if available)) to total
assets, times 100, if market-to-book is available and below one; equal to zero if market-to-book is available
and higher than one; and missing if market-to-book is unavailable. Firm size is the market value of common
equity, with the stock price being the average stock close price during a scal year. CEO options is the ratio
of the total number of unexcercised options vested and not yet vested held by the executive at the scal year
end to the number of shares outstanding (ExecuComp). Market-to-book is the ratio of rm market value
(book value of total assets, plus market value of common equity, minus book value of common equity) to
total assets. ROA is the ratio of EBITDA to total assets. All explained and control variables are winsorized at
the 1% and 99% percentile. Ordinary least squares regressions of total payout yield are reported. Three-digit
SIC industry and year dummies are included. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Signicance at 1%,
5%, and 10% is denoted with ***, **, and *, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Total yield Total yield Total yield TPPS TPPS TPPS
1-Geo concentration -0.884*** -0.180**
(0.263) (0.0782)
Population -0.0763 -0.0210
(0.0695) (0.0206)
Geographical area 5.19e-08 -5.20e-08
(3.27e-07) (9.70e-08)
Free cash ow 0.0590*** 0.0577** 0.0485* -0.00899** -0.00923** -0.00923**
(0.0227) (0.0227) (0.0248) (0.00398) (0.00398) (0.00451)
Firm size 0.392*** 0.384*** 0.366*** 0.317*** 0.316*** 0.314***
(0.0326) (0.0335) (0.0367) (0.00991) (0.0102) (0.0110)
CEO options 11.13*** 11.24*** 11.03*** 4.218*** 4.242*** 4.454***
(2.170) (2.171) (2.516) (0.590) (0.589) (0.685)
Market-to-book -0.605*** -0.595*** -0.602*** -0.131*** -0.130*** -0.131***
(0.0265) (0.0265) (0.0307) (0.00895) (0.00895) (0.0104)
ROA 6.420*** 6.394*** 6.420*** 2.320*** 2.313*** 2.361***
(0.496) (0.495) (0.587) (0.141) (0.141) (0.164)
Constant 0.900 1.675 1.035 -1.445*** -1.190*** -1.403***
(0.934) (1.579) (1.266) (0.265) (0.459) (0.352)
Observations 14,738 14,738 11,899 14,738 14,738 11,899
R-squared 0.156 0.155 0.165 0.256 0.256 0.282
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
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4.4.3 RobustnessCheck: GeographyMeasures ofAgency
Costs
A prominent explanation of dividends includes that of free cash ows. Ac-
cording to the free cash ow hypothesis, dividends constitute a pre-commitment
mechanism for managers to mitigate possible agency problems (Jensen, 1986).
John et al. (2011) use geography-based measures to proxy for severeness of
such agency problems. Unlike the approach in this study, their research
design is based on using rms’ headquarters locations. Firms with head-
quarters in the densely populated areas are believed to have lower agency
costs and are expected to pay out lower dividends. At the same time, these
rms may exhibit a higher investor awareness. Therefore, it proves impor-
tant to disentangle the eects of the headquarters location and the region of
economic activity on dividend payouts.
I construct a top ten indicator variable from John et al. (2011), which is set to
one if the rm’s headquarters are located in one of the ten largest (based on
population size) CMSAs and zero otherwise. As the indicator variable would
treat rms closely located to one of the ten largest CMSAs the same way as
it would remotely located rms, I also use the logarithm of one plus the
distance between the rm’s headquarters and the closest top ten CMSA.14
The eect of the headquarters location might be stronger if rms suer from
higher agency costs of free cash ows. I test this conjecture by including the
interaction of my distance measure with free cash ows.
14More precisely, I use a middle point of the closest CMSA.
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The results of the benchmark models are reported in Table 4.4.6. In line with
the results of John et al. (2011), I nd that rms located in one of the ten
largest CMSAs pay a signicantly lower dividend (rst column). I also nd
a positive, although not statistically signicant, relation when I use the log-
arithm of the distance to the headquarters instead of the indicator variable
(second column). In line with expectations, free cash ows are positively
associated with dividend yield; however, the combined eect with distance
to the top 10 is signicantly negative (third column). I use these benchmark
models and additionally include my main explanatory variable, geographic
dispersion (columns four to six). I nd that the eect of the rm’s operations
locations is robust to an inclusion of the headquarters variables. Coecients
on geographic dispersion
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Table 4.4.6: Robustness Checks: Geography Measures of Agency Costs
The sample includes Compustat rms with available geographic, demographic, and CEO compensation data,
and excludes nancial rms (SIC 6000—6999), regulated industries (SIC 4900—4999), rms with total assets
below $20 million, and rms incorporated outside the USA or in the non-contiguous territories. The sample
period is 1993—2010. Dividend yield is the ratio of dividends on common stock to the market value of com-
mon equity, times 100. Central location in top 10 (25) consolidated metropolitan statistical area (CMSA) is a
dummy set to one if a rm’s headquarters (Compustat) are located in the top 10 (25) CMSA; zero otherwise.
Distance to top 10 CMSA is the distance in kilometers from the rm’s headquarters location to the middle
point of the closest CMSA if the rm’s headquarters are located outside the top 10 CMSA; zero otherwise.
Geographic dispersion here is the log of one plus the number of distinct states counts (SEC 10-K lings). Be-
sides, regressions include standard rm-specic controls. Free cash ow is the ratio of cash ow (operating
income before depreciation, minus interest expense (if available), minus income taxes net of the change in
deferred tax and investment tax and investment tax credits (if available)) to total assets, times 100, if market-
to-book is available and below one; equal to zero if market-to-book is available and higher than one; and
missing if market-to-book is unavailable. Firm size is the market value of common equity, with the stock
price being the average stock close price during a scal year. CEO options is the ratio of the total number
of unexcercised options vested and not yet vested held by the executive at the scal year end to the number
of shares outstanding (ExecuComp). Market-to-book is the ratio of rm market value (book value of total
assets, plus market value of common equity, minus book value of common equity) to total assets. ROA is the
ratio of EBITDA to total assets. All variables, excluding geographic dispersion, are winsorized at the 1% and
99% percentile. Ordinary least squares regressions of dividend yield are reported. Three-digit SIC industry
and year dummies are included. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Signicance at 1%, 5%, and 10%
is denoted with ***, **, and *, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Div yield Div yield Div yield Div yield Div yield Div yield
Central location -0.107*** -0.111***
(0.0209) (0.0209)
Distance to top 10 0.00487 0.00534 0.00453 0.00499
(0.00387) (0.00382) (0.00387) (0.00382)
Free cash ow* -0.00127** -0.00125**
Distance to top 10 (0.000637) (0.000636)
Geo dispersion -0.0662*** -0.0625*** -0.0623***
(0.0214) (0.0220) (0.0219)
Free cash ow 0.0296*** 0.0314*** 0.0353*** 0.0302*** 0.0320*** 0.0359***
(0.00613) (0.00632) (0.00698) (0.00614) (0.00632) (0.00698)
Firm size 0.111*** 0.0914*** 0.0917*** 0.120*** 0.0991*** 0.0994***
(0.00906) (0.00952) (0.00952) (0.00954) (0.00998) (0.00999)
CEO options -5.028*** -5.052*** -5.063*** -5.039*** -5.068*** -5.079***
(0.432) (0.436) (0.436) (0.433) (0.437) (0.437)
Market-to-book -0.101*** -0.0904*** -0.0903*** -0.106*** -0.0952*** -0.0951***
(0.00599) (0.00608) (0.00609) (0.00627) (0.00640) (0.00640)
ROA 0.403*** 0.496*** 0.511*** 0.389*** 0.485*** 0.500***
(0.106) (0.108) (0.109) (0.106) (0.108) (0.108)
Constant 0.614** 0.835** 0.835** 0.744*** 0.956** 0.956**
(0.280) (0.383) (0.385) (0.283) (0.386) (0.387)
Observations 15,894 14,803 14,803 15,894 14,803 14,803
R-squared 0.314 0.314 0.315 0.315 0.315 0.315
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
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are all strongly signicantly negative and economically sensible. In contrast
to the mixed results for the headquarters location, the remaining controls
are all signicant (at the 1% level) with the expected signs.
4.4.4 Robustness Check: Other Control Variables
It may be the case that local rms are located in economically depressed
rural areas which exhibit a higher proportion of elderly population due to
urbanization and rural migration. These rms were shown to cater to the
needs of the retired investors and pay out dividends, since their investor
clientèle is dependent on the dividend income (Becker et al., 2011). To avoid
a potential problem of spurious correlations between investor awareness and
dividend payouts, I control for the dividend clientèle explanation. Moreover,
the higher the percentage of retired investors in the region of a rm’s eco-
nomic presence, the higher the chances that they represent a group of a rm
potential investors. Furthermore, not only size, but also the characteristics
of a rm’s potential investor base may inuence its payout policy. There-
fore, it proves necessary to control for the dividend demand in the sense
of Becker et al. (2011) in my dividend regressions. In the rst model from
Table 4.4.7, I include the proportion of the population aged over 65 years
living in the state where the rm is headquartered as a dummy variable set
to one if the proportion is higher than the sample median proportion; and
zero otherwise.15 The geographic dispersion variable is highly signicant in
15To be consistent with Becker et al. (2011), I use U.S. Census Bureau 2000 data on the head-
quarter state population for the years before 2000 and Census 2010 data for subsequent years.
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terms of standard condence levels after controlling for dividend demand
from the elderly population. The elderly population enters the regression
with a signicantly positive coecient, which conrms the dividend clien-
tèle explanation of dividends.
Next, I examine cross-sectional dierences in the awareness eect on div-
idends. Specically, I explore whether the eect of awareness on dividend
payouts is dierent among lesser-known and better-known rms. I expect
that smaller rms should prot from an increase in the state economic pres-
ence more than rms that are already large and enjoy a relatively high in-
vestor recognition than that of smaller rms. Hence, smaller rms should
exhibit higher magnitudes of the awareness eect compared to bigger rms.
To sort observations into size quintiles, I use logged market capitalization.
Next, I construct Size 1, Size 2, Size 3, Size 4, and Size 5 dummy variables
equal to one if an observation logged market capitalization is in the rst,
second, third, fourth, or fth quintile of the sample logged market capitaliza-
tion, respectively; and zero otherwise. Coecients on the interaction terms
of a rm’s size quintile dummy and a rm’s geographic dispersion should
provide evidence on the magnitude of the awareness eect across dierent
rm size groups. Results from Table 4.4.7 show that coecients on the inter-
action terms monotonically decrease with the rm’s size. Since interaction
terms with the rst two size quintiles are signicant, I conclude that the
awareness eect is evident among the smaller rms.
In the next set of tests I exploit the fact that the awareness eect on dividend
payouts should primarily be driven by potential and not current investors.
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As motivated in the introduction, rms pay out dividends in order to at-
tract investors who are not yet aware of the rm; that is, to attract potential
investors. In the subsequent regression specications I interact geographic
dispersion with a rm’s current shareholder structure and not that of po-
tential investors, since the latter is not directly observable. Specically, I
introduce a free oat variable which is computed as the percentage of total
shares in issue available to retail investors. This variable is not an accu-
rate measure of retail investor ownership, but can be viewed as an upper
bound for the latter. Taking into account the limitation of the proxy for re-
tail shareholder base, this analysis serves as a soft test of the awareness eect
on dividends. I expect that the current retail ownership structure proxied by
free oat should neither economically signicantly amplify nor weaken the
awareness eect.
Evidence from both the dividend yield and the dividends per share models
(model (3) and model (4) from Table 4.4.7, respectively) is compliant with
my expectation. As follows from Table 4.4.7, geographic dispersion remains
highly statistically signicant in both dividend yields and per share model
specications after controlling for free oat. Free oat does not explain the
whole cross-section of dividend yields. The interaction term is statistically
signicantly positive in the dividend yield model (model (3)). Therefore, the
combined eect of awareness and free oat on dividend yield is
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Table 4.4.7: Robustness Checks: Other Control Variables
The sample includes Compustat rms with available geographic, demographic, and CEO compensation data,
and excludes nancial rms (SIC 6000—6999), regulated industries (SIC 4900—4999), rms with total assets
below $20 million, and rms incorporated outside the USA or in the non-contiguous territories. The sample
period is 1993—2010. Dividend yield is the ratio of dividends on common stock to the market value of common
equity, times 100. Dividend per share is the dollar amount of dividends paid on an ordinary share. Geographic
dispersion here is the log of one plus a number of distinct states counts (SEC 10-K lings). Older 65 is
a dummy variable equal to one if the proportion of the population aged no younger than 65 years old in
the total headquarter state population is higher than the sample median fraction; and equal zero otherwise
(Census 2000, Census 2010). I sort observations into size quintiles based on logged market capitalization.
Next, I construct Size 1, Size 2, Size 3, Size 4, and Size 5 dummy variables. Size 1, Size 2, Size 3, Size 4, and
Size 5 are equal to one if logged market capitalization is in the rst, second, third, fourth, or fth quintile,
respectively; and zero otherwise. The fth quintile is excluded from regressions to avoid multicollinearity.
Free oat is obtained as the percentage of total shares in issue available to ordinary investors (Datastream).
Besides, regressions include standard rm-specic controls. Free cash ow is the ratio of cash ow (operating
income before depreciation, minus interest expense (if available), minus income taxes net of the change in
deferred tax and investment tax and investment tax credits (if available)) to total assets, times 100, if market-
to-book is available and below one; equal to zero if market-to-book is available and higher than one; and
missing if market-to-book is unavailable. Firm size is the market value of common equity, with the stock
price being the average stock close price during a scal year. CEO options is the ratio of the total number
of unexcercised options vested and not yet vested held by the executive at the scal year end to the number
of shares outstanding (ExecuComp). Market-to-book is the ratio of rm market value (book value of total
assets, plus market value of common equity, minus book value of common equity) to total assets. ROA is the
ratio of EBITDA to total assets. All variables, excluding geographic dispersion and older 65, are winsorized
at the 1% and 99% percentile. Ordinary least squares regressions of dividend yield ((1)—(3)) and dividend per
share ((4)) are reported. Three-digit SIC industry and year dummies are included. Robust standard errors are
in parentheses. Signicance at 1%, 5%, and 10% is denoted with ***, **, and *, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Div yield DPS Div yield DPS Div yield DPS
Geo dispersion*Size 1 -0.0991* -0.111***
(0.0581) (0.0170)
Geo dispersion*Size 2 -0.0984* -0.112***
(0.0530) (0.0171)
Geo dispersion*Size 3 -0.0705 -0.0904***
(0.0508) (0.0174)
Geo dispersion*Size 4 -0.0104 -0.0605***
(0.0474) (0.0170)
Geo dispersion -0.0631*** -0.0323*** -0.000753 0.0453*** -0.304*** -0.0683***
(0.0214) (0.00619) (0.0399) (0.0155) (0.0603) (0.0192)
Older 65 0.0146** 0.00438**
(0.00627) (0.00174)
Size 1 0.572*** 0.422***
(0.169) (0.0541)
Size 2 0.387*** 0.330***
(0.149) (0.0506)
Size 3 0.204 0.222***
(0.141) (0.0491)
Size 4 -0.0654 0.0943**
(0.132) (0.0476)
Geo dispersion*Free oat 0.00231*** 0.000243
(0.000826) (0.000266)
Free oat -0.00322 0.000755
(0.00223) (0.000719)
Observations 15,894 15,894 15,894 15,894 9,122 9,122
R-squared 0.314 0.414 0.318 0.428 0.323 0.431
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
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weaker than that of awareness alone — albeit very modestly. Also, regres-
sion results explaining dividends per share are not indicative of a signicant
eect of current retail shareholder base on the awareness eect (model (4)).
Further, the interaction term is non-signicant in all other payout specica-
tions, including repurchase yield and repurchase per share, total yield, and
total payout per share (not tabulated). Combined, these pieces of evidence
suggest that the mechanism of attracting retail investors with payouts be-
comes less relevant or even irrelevant for rms with an already high fraction
of current retail investors in their shareholder base.
4.5 Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to explore whether the well-documented rm-
beneting value eects of high investor awareness carry over to a rm’s
payout policy. Specically, I ask whether a high rm geographic spread,
which is generically associated with a high investor awareness, is respon-
sible for a management decision to pay out less than local but otherwise
similar rms.
I document that geographically widespread rms, on average, pay lower div-
idends and repurchases, an empirical fact that also holds for rms within a
high population density and in large geographical areas. The geography-
related dierence in dividends amounts to approximately 70% of an average
sample dividend yield (or 7% after accounting for other determinants of div-
idends).
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I nd that the eect of geographic spread is robust to controlling for other
geography-related explanations of dividends from the literature. In partic-
ular, I check for the dividend clientèle eect, using the rm’s headquarters
locations. I also control for the central location of a rm in the presence of
high free cash ows to account for the severity of agency problems.
In addition, I propose investor awareness to be a channel of the geography
eect. I identify an overlap between states in which a rm maintains an
economical presence and states from which a rm was searched for on the
Internet. Retail rms, which are highly visible to potential investors, exhibit
a stronger awareness eect than non-retail rms. I also nd that this aect
of investor awareness on dividends is contingent on a rm’s size: it is most
pronounced among the rms in the lowest size quintiles, which are expected
to prot more from an increase in investor recognition.
The results of this study have implications for payout policies of joint stock
companies. The evidence presented here highlights the importance of gen-
eral investor awareness about the rm on setting a payout policy. This paper
empirically conrms that investor awareness increases with the rm’s ge-
ographic spread, making it less critical to pay out to investors in order to
attract their attention. This paper sheds light on the importance of generic
rm characteristics, such as geographic locations on investor awareness.
Further work could investigate whether more easily adjustable and dynami-
cally changing factors of investor awareness such as, for instance, marketing
expenses aect a rm payout policy.
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4.A Data Appendix to Chapter 4
Variable Denition and source
Panel A. Firm geography and 10-K based measures
Geographic dispersion In Table 4.2.1 and Figure 4.2.1, the variable is dened as the number of
distinct states cited at least once in the rm’s annual nancial state-
ment; in all other tables as the logarithm of one plus the number of
states cited at least once in the 10-K of a rm. Source: U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) 10-K lings
Geographic concentration The sum of squared state citation shares. Source: SEC 10-K lings
State citation share The number of state counts in the 10-K ling, divided by the total num-
ber of counts of all states in the 10-K ling. Source: SEC 10-K lings
State count share The number of 10-K lings in which a state was mentioned at least
once, divided by the total number of 10-K lings in my sample. Source:
SEC 10-K lings
Population In Table 4.2.1, the variable is dened as the total population in states
which a rm mentions at least once in its SEC 10-K ling. In all other
tables the variable is logged. Source: Census 2010
Geographical area The total area of the states which a rm mentions at least once in its
10-K ling. Source: Census 2010
Older 65 The proportion of the population older than 65 years old in the total
population of the headquarter state, times 100. Source: Census 2000,
Census 2010
Google search volume (GSV) The search volume of the rm in the state, scaled to a range of 0 to 100
over the period from 2004 till present. Source: Google Trends
Panel B. Payout variables
Dividend yield Dividends paid on common stock divided by the market value of com-
mon equity, times 100. Source: Compustat
Repurchase yield The value of repurchased common and preferred stock, minus redemp-
tion value of preferred stock (if reported), divided by the market value
of common equity, times 100. Source: Compustat
Total payout yield Dividends paid on common stock, plus repurchase of common stock,
divided by the market value of common equity, times 100. Source:
Compustat
Dividend per share Dividends paid on common stock, divided by the number of shares
outstanding, in USD. Source: Compustat
Repurchase per share, USD Repurchases of common stock, divided by the number of shares out-
standing, in USD. Source: Compustat
Total payout per share, USD Dividends paid on common stock, plus repurchase of common stock,
divided by the number of shares outstanding, in USD. Source: Compu-
stat
Dividends/payout Dividends paid on common stock, divided by the total payout on com-
mon stock, times 100. Source: Compustat
Dividend payer The indicator variable equals one if a rm pays dividends at least once
over the sample period and zero if a rm never pays a dividend. Source:
Compustat
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Section 4.A continued here
Panel C. Control variables
Central location in top 10 CMSA The indicator variable is set to one if a rm’s headquarters (Compus-
tat) are located in the top-ten cumulative metropolitan statistical area
(CMSA) (Census 2000); zero otherwise. Source: Compustat, Census
2000
Distance to top 10 CMSA The distance in kilometers from the rm’s headquarters location (Com-
pustat) to the middle point of the closest CMSA (Census 2000) if a rm’s
headquarters are located outside the top-ten CMSA; zero otherwise.
Source: Compustat, Census 2000, Google Maps, own computations
Distance The logarithm of one plus the distance in miles to the closest top-ten
CMSA (Census 2010). Source: Compustat, Census 2010, Google Maps,
own computations
Free cash ow The ratio of operating income before depreciation, minus interest ex-
pense, minus income taxes net of the change in deferred tax and invest-
ment tax and investment tax credits to total assets. Source: Compustat
Firm size Market capitalization, the number of common shares outstanding,
times the stock close price during a scal year. Source: Compustat
CEO options The ratio of the total number of unexcercised options vested and not
yet vested held by the executive at the scal year end to the number of
shares outstanding. Source: Compustat ExecuComp
Market-to-book The ratio of the sum of total assets and the sum of all issue-level mar-
ket values, minus common shareholders’ interest in a company in the
event of liquidation of company assets, to total assets. Source: Com-
pustat
ROA The ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amorti-
zation to the total assets. Source: Compustat
Free oat The percentage of total shares in issue available to ordinary investors.
Source: Datastream
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